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The question of German reunification has endured over time, conflict,
and the convulsions of global power. After thirty years, the Germans
are still pondering over the rent in their nation's boundries and debating
whether the present schism is immutable or will be reversed sometime in
the future. However, the reunification issue is indeed significant beyond
the scope of German cohesion— it imports directly on international
security and lies at the nexus of superpower relations. The present
agitation in Poland may be the impetus for the revival of the reunifica-
tion chant. This research provides an analysis of German reunification
with an emphasis on the Soviet perspective. I will examine the issue
by: reviewing the history of reunification negotiations from 1947
—
present: exploring the advances gained by OSTPOLITIK/WESTPOLITIK;
studying the sentiments of the East European countries on the reunifica-
tion issue; discussing the inextricable linkage of the problem to the
interdependence in economic relations between the Federal Republic of
Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and the Soviet Union; and
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I. INTRODUCTION
"I do not foresee under what auspices and conditions the
Germans will get together again, but they will. One Germany
is not something which anybody thinks of as being right around
the corner. It's a real desire in the soul of the German nation,
whether in the west or the east. It would be wrong for any
nation to believe that the nation state is normal for any nation
for any nation but not for the Germans. "^
While the division of a single nation between rival blocs is no
longer a novelty in international relations, it is no less dangerous
to peace for being familiar. Of the three nations now so divided,
Germany deserves special attention on a number of grounds: it was the
first nation to be divided and has remained so the longest; it is the
only nation in which one part has ties to and access to, a great city
existing as an enclave 100 miles deep in the other part; and most im-
portant, it is the only great power to be so divided. And the prospects
for bloodshed over Germany's division are potentially much greater, for
conflict over Germany would involve the American and Soviet forces
directly and would probably be fought with the most modern weapons avail-
able, nuclear weapons. It is therefore the most serious case of a
divided nation and the most disastrous consequence of World War II if
only because it might well become a contributing cause of World War III.
It would be a gross error to regard the division as a stabilizing factor
in world affairs, it is an unstable condition that might eventually
unravel a world conflict.
Quote from Helmut Schmidt in an article entitled "Schmidt's




Figure 1. Map of East and West Germany

It should be clear that the Germans do not merely want reunification
as one desirable thing among many. They really want it -- even though
so far they have taken only preliminary, indirect, and partial steps
2
toward that goal. These sentiments are evident not only among West
Germans, but as Melvin Croan points out, the quest for reunification
hits East Germans with possible even greater fury.
"As visitors from abroad quickly discover, social manners and
mores are much more traditionally German in East than in West
Germany. Grassroots sentiment remains deeply attached to the
notion of a single shared German nationality, irrespective of
the country's post World War II division. If anything, the
popular sense of identification with a common German nation is
currently much stronger in the GDR than in the Federal Republic
of Germany. "3
Reunification, of course, does not depend solely on the Germans.
The Russians, for their part, realize that the key to Germany's eventual
reunification lies in Moscow rather than Washington. For this reason
this thesis will focus on the Soviet perspective of German reunification.
Moscow will have to face some momentous decisions on the fate of Eastern
2
Walter Scheel, President of the Federal Republic addressed the
United Nations on September 19, 1972 when the FRG was accepted as a
member. His speech contained these thoughts on unification: "This time,
28 years have passed since the end of the war. This illustrates the
fate of my people: Origins and victims of war, divided without its own
doing, now living in two states and uncertain as to a common future.
Do you realize why we hesitated to cross the threshold to the United
Nations. It is painful to face up to the political reality of the
division of one's own country. We were afraid such a step might convey
the impression that we had given up, abandoned hope of unity... Our aim
remains clear: The Federal Republic of Germany will continue to work
for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover
its unity in free self determination." There is certainly no equivoca-
tion in his desire concerning the matter at hand. Walter Scheel, "For
German Unity and Peace in Europe," Central Europe Journal , Oct/Nov 73,
No. 10/11 .
'
Melvin Croan, "The Germanies at 30 — New Country, Old Nationality,"
Foreign Policy, No. 37, Winter 1979-80 p 142.

Europe in the future, not the least of which will be the growing chant
for German reunification. Germany's division, now three and a half
decades old, will not continue indefinitely without grave dangers of
war. The West has never publically offered the Soviets much more than
an invitation to turn over their part of Germany to NATO and leave. The
Soviets, except under Stalin and momentarily under Malenkov, have never
offered much more to the West than to surrender West Berlin. Now that
the fires are reignited in Poland, the flame may spread to Eastern
Europe, and the reunification of Germany may cease to be a chimera and
become a real ity.
This thesis will initially examine the history of negotiations on
the reunification of Germany, particularly the negotiations involving
the Soviet Union. This exploration will begin with the realities that
emerged from the World War II conferences on Germany and travel to the
present Brezhnev era.
In Chapter III the effects of OSTPOLITIK/WESTPOLITIK on the reunifica-
tion issue will be discussed. The chapter will focus on the Soviet
reaction to OSTPOLITIK and will explore the West German initiatives
from 1969 to the present.
The fourth chapter will discuss the East European sentiments about
a future reunification. The fate of Germany is inextricably linked to
the future of the other East European countries. If Poland suceeds in
its reform movement it is almost certain Czechoslovakia and East Germany
will not be far behind in forging their own measure of independence.
As recently as July 26, 1981, Der Speigal reported that Polish unrest
was spreading to East Germany. The West German news magazine further
10

reported that the East Germans have been encouraged by the way the Poles
stood up to their communist government and, to signal their pugnacity,
the East Germans have gone on strike for better working conditions in
sections of some plants; distributed illegal leaflets calling for support
of the Polish Solidarity Union; and clashed with police in several
cities. It is therefore imperative to examine the status of the East
European states and their sentiments vis-a-vis German reunification.
Chapter V will examine the economic interdependence of the Federal
Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet
Union. The issues discussed will include the implications of the new
Hamburg natural gas pipeline, the extent of GDR/FRG/USSR trade and the
way in which these closer economic ties may be parlayed into new
security arrangements.
Finally, Chapter VI will explore the conditions under which the
Germanies may eventually become unified. The subjects of an evolving
Eastern Europe and the politico-military alliances of NATO and the




II. THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS
The diplomatic time and energy devoted to the reunification question
by the Great Powers since World War II faithfully reflects its importance,
Measured on this scale, no East-West issue can rival the German question
for top position. Its closest rival in Europe was the Austrian state
4
treaty, which took ten years to complete. The German question has \ *
already taken much longer, and in the years since 1954, it alone has
been a major (or the major) topic at no less than two full scale summit
meetings, three foreign ministers meetings, one Kennedy-Khrushchev
meeting, a Chancellor-Foreign Minister meeting and any number of Western
Big Three conferences. The conferences and events reflect the common
consensus in East and West that Germany is the master key to Europe.
On three occasions in the past three decades, the negotiations and
conferences have been punctuated by crises which have assumed major
proportions. Two crises, focusing on Berlin, kept the world's attention
at fever pitch for a year or more at a time. Where the first Berlin
crisis in 1948 demonstrated the final breakdown of the occupying powers
to administer Germany as a unit, the second Berlin crisis, beginning in
5
1958-59, underlined the dangers implicit in keeping her divided. And
in 1980, the neighboring crisis in Poland augurs for a resurgence of
the German unification chants and a potentially volatile situation.
4
In May, 1955 the Austrian Peace Treaty was settled, with the Soviet
Union and the West signing a treaty that guaranteed Austria's neutrality.
John Dornberg, The New Germans
,




























A. THE SOVIET DIPLOMACY OF WORLD WAR II
1 . Teheran, Quebec, and Moscow
It took only a few wartime conferences, held over a period of
two years, for the Allies to agree on the division of Germany. It has
since taken a long succession of conferences, strung over three decades
to record their inability or unwillingness to put Germany back together
again. While Germany was still the common foe and the War was still
raging, it was not too difficult to arrive at a concerted plan to deal
with the immediate problem. All were against Nazism; all were in favor
of disarming Germany and dismantling her war industry; all wanted strict
controls for Germany's future. But it proved easier to agree on the
need for rendering Germany harmless than to agree on the means for
keeping her that way. And it was easier to agree on the principle that
Germany should be punished than to agree on what the punishment should
consist of. Divergencies among the Allies appeared early: the Soviets
in particular favored thoroughgoing harshness in all respects.
Toward the end of World War II, Stalin began to reveal his post
war program for Germany. The Germans were to suffer: in blood, in
sweat, in land, and in treasure. At the Teheran Conference (November-
December 1943) Stalin proposed a toast to the execution of some fifty
thousand German officers at the end of the war. Roosevelt attempted to
treat the incident as a joke; Churchill did not. Stalin traced a
Anton DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers , New York, 1976, p. 74,
Steven Garrett, Lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, November 1980.
14

frontier for Germany which would give Konisburg to the Soviet Union,
o
leaving the larger nation as he said "on the neck of Germany." Stalin
predicted that Germany would rebuild her power in 15-20 years — there-
fore, Germany's industrial capacity should be reduced. The Soviet Union
also needed the German machinery to replace destroyed equipment and
"at least four million Germans" as laborers in the work of Soviet re-
construction. Germany should, said Stalin, be "broken up so that she
could not reunite." Because the "Germans fight like fierce beasts"
and it would be best to "break up and scatter the German tribes."
Churchill said he was for partition in principle but in the form of a
new Danubian Confederation that would include Southern Germany and
isolate Prussia. Roosevelt advocated the partition of Germany into
five states: Prussia, Hanover, and the northwestern area, Saxony with
Leipzig, Hesse with Darmstadt and Kassel , and Bavaria with Baden and
g
Wurtenberg.
Before the next meeting of the Big Three, Churchill met with
Roosevelt at Quebec and with Stalin in Moscow. At the Quebec Conference
(September 13-17, 1944) Roosevelt produced a plan for German partition.
This was essentially what came to be known as the Morganthau Plan, which
would have dismembered Germany altogether. Under this plan, East
Prussia and Silesia would go to the Soviet Union and Poland, respectively;
France would gain the Saar and the left bank of the Rhine (and even Up
to Moselle); Denmark would annex the area north of the Kiel Canal; the
Ruhr and the area south of the Kiel canal would be under international
8
"0ne Germany or Two" ORBIS , Summer 1969,
Bernice Carroll, "The Partition of Germany—Cold War Compromise",
World Affairs , 1969.
15

control; and the rest of Germany would be partitioned into a North
German State and South German state. The Quebec version of the
Morganthau plan also called for the deindustrialization of the Ruhr, the
Saar, and the rest of Germany. If this had passed Germany would be a
fragmented, agrarian state. Not a very sagacious plan, to say the
least.
10
This hasty proposal was soon rescinded, Churchill had never
really been convinced of its wisdom and FDR's Secretary of State,
Cordell Hull was completely opposed,
Churchill's Moscow visit (October 9-17, 1944) led to an agreement
between the Prime Minister and Stalin for a general division of Eastern
Europe into two spheres of influence, with Great Britain to control
Greece and share control of Yugoslavia. Polish bounderies were discussed
(.the Curzon line in the East and the Ober in the West) and Stalin showed
more interest in Churchill's plan for a Danubian Confederation. Inter-
im
national control was envisaged for the Ruhr, the Saar and Kiel.
2. Yalta
At the next meeting of the Big Three, at Yalta (February 4-12
1945), the discussions were resumed. Stalin referred to the Germans as
"Savages" and his intent was still punative, A few months earlier, he
had told Stanislav Mikolajczyk, the Polish leader, that he thought
Frederick H. Hartmann, Germany Between East and West , (Prentice-
Hall, 1965) p. 51.
The Soviet position on the Morganthau Plan is vague, yet Moscow






communism would fit Germany like "a saddle fitted a cow," -- in other
words not at all. Stalin proposed the General Dismemberment of Germany;
it was to be divided into Prussia, Southern Germany (Bavaria and Austria)
and Ruhr Westphalia (under international control). This proposal was
closer to Churchill's earlier position, but at this time the British
Prime Minister argued against a binding and permanent commitment to any
precise plan. Roosevelt, although still very much in favor of partition,
attempted a compromise. According to the agreement which resulted, the
Allies would "possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the
exercise of such authority, they will take such steps, including the
complete disarmament, demilitarization and the dismemberment of Germany
as they deem requisite for future peace and security. The procedure
for dismemberment and the precise design for the partition were to be
14devised by a commission.
The desire to punish was still very much in evidence, but with
some difference. Stalin foresaw nothing but pure gain in the dismember-
ment of Germany: a weakened Germany, shorn of its Bismarkian power,
could not threaten the Soviet Union, and it might well be brought under
Soviet domination. Roosevelt was thinking of ending the threat to
15
world peace, which a united Germany had in his view twice represented.
13
Elmer Plische, Contemporary Government of Germany
,
[Boston Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1961, p. 13.
Terrence Prittie, Germany Divided
,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Inc., 1960) p. 25,
15
James Wolfe commented on the United States position in 1947 by
describing Secretary of State Byrnes' response to Molotov's assertion
that the United States really did not want reunification. "Byrnes him-
self rather tacitly agreed when he reported after the fourth Council of
Foreign Ministers meeting that the Western powers were opposed to strong
national government in Germany and favored instead a highly federalized
system " Wolfe pp. 43-43.
17

Churchill wanted the division of Germany but he did not want to open
the door to Soviet hegemony.
The punishment theme on which the Big Three agreed, and the
questioning of its extent and precise nature, on which they disagreed,
appeared again in the related question of frontiers. Stalin proposed
the Oder-Western Neisse as Poland's western border. Churchill, while
supporting the movement of Polish frontiers to the west, cautioned
against stuffing "the Polish goose so full of German food that it got
indigestion." Roosevelt agreed to the concept of the Oder boundery
but added that there would appear to be little justification for ex-
tending it to the Western Neisse. The New Poland — which was to be
established on the basis of "free and unfettered elections" by "universal
suffrage and secret ballot" and in which all democratic and anti-Nazi
parties should have the right to take part and put forward candidates
1 g
would be given new frontiers.
It was agreed that France would be allocated a zone of occupation
formed out of the British and American zones and that she would become
a member of a Allied Control Council for Germany. Plans were also drawn
up for war crimes trials of the major Nazis. Finally, the occupation
Frederick Hartmann, p. 62.
Michael Balfour, Summary of Multipartite Agreements and Disagree-
ments on Germany , 1948, p. 118, quoted in Frederick Hartman.
18
History has taught the Russians a basic geopolitical lesson; that
the vast plains of Eastern Europe afforded no defense other than
distance. Therefore, it was essential that any real or potential enemy
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Figure 3. Territories lost to Germany, postwar
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zones, as recommended by the European Advisory Commission, were
formally approved by the Soviet Union. The United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff, meeting at Yalta on February 7th agreed -- without raising
the question of access routes to Berlin from the Western zones «- that
"there are no reasons why the Draft Protocal ... should not be
19
approved."
The punishment theme occurred again in the matter of reparations
Again Stalin demanded substantial reparations, claiming that the Soviet
Union had lost more than a third of its horses and almost a third of
its cattle; in addition some 1,710 towns had been destroyed as well as
31,500 factories and some 40,000 miles of railroad right of way —
20
approximately 128 billion of direct losses. The Soviets wanted annual
payments in current production over a ten year period (implying a long
occupation) to supplement confiscation of industry. Churchill objected
to the "spectre of a starving Germany, which would present a serious
problem for the Allies." If annual payment in kind were to be made, the
German people must eat, for, he pointed out, if one "wished a horse to
pull a wagon," one must "give it fodder." Stalin wanted 10 billion for
21
Soviet reparations.
The final protocal met Stalin's demands only to a certain point.
It provided that Germany was to "pay in kind for the losses caused by
her to the allied nations..." These reparations were to take three
19
Issac Deutscher, The Great Contest; Russia and the West
,
(New York
Bellantine Books, 1961) p 15.
20
James H. Wolfe, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany




forms: "removals" of German assets inside and outside German frontiers
"within 2 years after surrender, chiefly for the purpose of destroying
the war potential of Germany; annual deliveries of goods from current
22
production for a period to be fixed; and the use of German labor."
In the wake of the Yalta Conference, the European Advisory Com-
mission did not come to serious grips with the issue of German dis-
memberment. On March 24th, Churchill indicated he wanted to postpone
considering "dismembering Germany until my thoughts about Russians
23intentions have been cleared away.
The war ended. The day after the Soviets signed the surrender
terms (May 9, 1945) Stalin declared the "Soviet Union does not intend
either to dismember or to destroy Germany." Later that month, when
asked why he changed his mind Stalin replied that his own ideas "had
24
been turned down at Yalta."
Whatever their reasons, the Big Three began to treat dismember-
ment — in Stalin's sense -- as a dead issue. Consequently, at the
next important summit conference, at Potsdam in July-August 1945, the
focus shifted away from formal final partition to the problems of Big





Churchill foresaw the strategic posture the Soviet Union would
assume after the German collapse, and he desired every possible device
be employed to counterbalance the new power in the East.
24
Churchill's equivocation on the issue of dismemberment must have





The Potsdam Conference (July 17-Aug 2, 1945) continued the
punishment theme with its corollaries of disagreement over its nature
and extent. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the
Allied Control Council was to be guided were spelled out. In organiz-
ing the German economy primary emphasis was to be given to the
development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.
The disagreement of the Allies over reparations continued to
be marked. Stalin was not satisfied that he was getting enough. On
the eve of the conference, Stalin transferred that part of the Soviet
zone east of the Oder-Western Neisse to Polish "administration." At
Potsdam, he blandly asserted that "no single German remained in the
territory to be given Poland," and asked the western allies to accept
25
this fait accompli. It was clear that the American view was that
the territorial issue was not finally settled,, The Soviet physical
occupation was accepted for the time being, and the Soviets were quite
content to leave it at that. So the territorial issue was uneasily
"settled" in conjunction with the reparations issue which Stalin now
27began to "interpret."
25
James H. Wolfe. Chapter 2,
The unity of Germany as a political and economic entity was im-
plicitly recognized, and the Russians later claimed great credit for
having firmly opposed, as early as March 1945, any Western proposals
for the partition of Germany... But while such a partition was not
brought about, Potsdam undoubedly laid the foundation for a different
kind of partition. All Russian attempts to secure a foothold in the
Ruhr were firmly rejected; but what made the "zonal" division of
Germany even more obvious was the agreement that was reached on
22

4. Post Potsdam Second Thoughts
The ink on the Potsdam Agreement was hardly dry before all con-
cerned were having second thoughts. The economic provisions of the
accord could have produced the intended result only by superb coopera-
tion among all the occupying powers,, When the occupation started,
the needs of the German people for the most elementary means of survival
began immediately to get in the way of carrying out the agreement.
The payment of reparations should not have even been attempted until
the situation in Germany had been brought under control. Had repara-
tions been delayed, there would have been much more reason for continued
cooperation by the Soviets. As it was, they got much of what they
wanted for little return; when the whole arrangement broke down, they
were ahead. To maintain perspective, though, it must be remembered
that even what the Soviets got seemed to them to be far short of what
27
they considered their due.
The Soviet Union had less difficulty than the West in clinging
to the basic pattern of the Potsdam accord. Its implementation implied
a weak and defenseless Germany for some time to come. With the
American and British haste to "send the boys home" as soon as hostilities
were terminated and the uncertainty of France's power in the early
reparations... The foundations for the real division of Germany,
officially still to be under Four Power control, were laid by the
reparations agreements reached at Potsdam. (Werth, Alexander, Russia
at War 1941-1945 , New York, Avon Book 1964),pp 922-23.
27
Richard Rossner, A Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy (.New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p 201.
23

postwar period, the Soviet Union was easily the strongest military
power on the continent of Europe. Because the great military threat
to Soviet interests in the twentieth century has come from Germany, the
weakness of the Western nations and Germany's utter lack of power served
28
the basic interests of the Stalin regime.
To weaken Germany further the Soviets converted spontaneous
and wholesale looting into a systematic process. While individual
soldiers took watches, pots and pans and radios, the Soviet government
took entire factories . Many of these factories, once dismantled, were
left to rust, lost in the bureaucratic maze and a dead loss to everyone.
Technicians and scientists were taken to the Soviet Union in droves,
here to work to rebuild the Russian homeland and apply German methods
and secrets to the improvement of Soviet strength. The hugh numbers
of prisoners of war taken by the Soviet Union were also put to work.
Because the Soviets were receiving factories from the western zones as
well, all Germany — and particularly the Soviet zone -- was being
milked dry for the benefit of the USSR. All East Germany became, in
29
effect, a vast slave plantation for Soviet purpose.
On September 6, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes, speaking at
Stuttgart, gave notice of a new approach. The U.S. was convinced that
"the time has come when the zonal boundaries should be regarded as
defining only the areas to be occupied for security purposes and not







States government has formally announced that it is its intention to
unify the economy of its own zone with any or all of the other zones
willing to participate in its unification. That the U.S. should be
first in recognizing the need for a new approach was not surprising.
The burden of furnishing aid to Britain and France, and now to Germany,
was a heavy one. The U.S. naturally wished to ease that burden by
making Germany self supporting. The willingness to take a more lenient
view might also have arisen from the fact that no physical devastation
30
had ever been visited on the United States , Byrnes went on to urge
the creation of a "democratic German government" which should be de-
militarized under a twenty-five year enforcement plan 3 He reiterated
that the revision of Germany's eastern frontiers in Poland's favor
31
would be supported by the United States.
In March and April 1947, the Foreign Ministers' Conference in
Moscow deadlocked on the German question, just as they were to do again
in November 1947. In the closing weeks of 1947, Secretary of State
Marshall reported "we cannot look forward to a united Germany at this
time. Vie must do the best we can in the area where our influence can
be felt."
32
On February 9, 1948, the Bizonal Charter was announced by the




Peter H. Merkl , The Origins of the West German Republic
,
(New





Sokolovsky walked out of the Allied Control Council in Berlin. This
marked the end of even the facade of Four-Power administration of all
Germany. In early April, the French zone united with the rest of West
Germany and on July 13th a currency reform was announced, and later
introduced in West Berlin. The Soviets countered immediately with
an intensification of the blockade of Berlin; through which they had
planned to discourage the West from establishing a separate West
33
German state.
B. STALINIST POLICY AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION
1 . Stalin's Perception
Stalin had established the East German system in the years
immediately after the occupation as a pilot state for a communist
Germany. By 1949, he was forced to acknowledge the failure of his
original plan. The Western powers engaged in a process of dividing
Germany because of the anxieties inspired by Stalin's attempt to divide
Europe,, Stalin's own response — his attempt to prevent the division
from taking place inside Germany — only accelerated it, When the
Berlin Blockade was lifted, NATO had already come into being and the
constitution of the West German state was being drawn up. But Stalin's
failure did not necessarily mean the abandonment of the plans for a
unified country. As so often in Stalinist diplomacy, he was ready to
33
The blockade was a symbol of the collapse of Four Power control,
and also heightened fears of an imminent military clash. Truman and
Acheson were reluctant to push the Russians very far on the breaking
of the blockade by force. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My
Years in the State Department
,
(New York: Signet, 1969), pp. 346-348.
26

settle for less than the best, and in this case a reunified Germany,
united on terms that would make it amenable to Soviet influence, and
where he could still hope that a Communist or Communist
—
leaning
country would emerge, was still infinitely preferable to a divided
nation, in which the greater and more powerful state would be assured
34
of Western protection and would develop a booming capitalist economy.
Thus, while Adenauer was working hard to integrate the Federal
Republic into the Western system, Stalin was still contemplating the
possibilities of German reunification. Adenauer has frequently been
accused, not least by the German Social Democrats, of making a cold
and heartless choice, and of deciding that the interests of the West
German state took precedence over the future of seventeen million
people in East Germany. In many ways these accusations are justified,
but at the same time one might wonder whether Adenauer felt that he had
any real choice. A reunified Germany which was open to Soviet domina-
tion might, in his view, have endangered the security and well being
of all Germans. His policy was diametrically opposed to that of Stalin,
and Stalin's own plans no doubt impelled Adenauer to press for Western
integration even more strongly than he would otherwise have done* In
consequence, by the beginning of the 1950s the West German state, in
concert with its European allies on the one hand and with the United
States on the other, was actively promoting a western system in which
it would play a fully integrated Dart. Adenauer's first offer to join
34
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NATO was made in November 1950: a fact which must have encouraged the
process of readjustment which was already going on in Soviet foreign
35
policy. It would not be long before Stalin offered the Western powers
what they professed really to want: that is, German reunification.
2 Rigors of Stalinism on GDR
But the contradictions of Stalin's policy were not resolved by
such a change of tactics, and were seemingly incapable of being resolved,
At the same time as Soviet diplomacy was beginning to explore new pos-
sibilities for German reunification—a process which was fully in accord
with the requirements of Stalinist foreign policy— the full rigours of
Stalinism were being imposed on the East German state. This very fact
was in itself enough to make the West Germans and the other powers
hesitate about exposing the rest of Germany to the dangers of Soviet
influence. The flexibility of Soviet foreign policy was heavily out-
weighed by the inflexibility of Stalinist domestic policy* This might
account for the fact that when Stalin's offer was made, early in 1952,
it was virtually ignored, and equally for the fact that when the East
German revolt of 1953 occurred, and when the Soviet leaders were clearly
hesitant, the western powers took no risk whatever of promoting German
reunification.
3. Paradoxes
The history of these years seems to be a history of four
paradoxical processes. First, it was the Soviet Union, rather than
35




the West, which showed an active interest in German reunification.
Second, that the German state, whose Stalinism was at least a match
for that of any other country in Eastern Europe, and whose loyalty to
the Soviet Union was the most dogmatic and the most binding, was at
the same time the country which was clearly considered the most ex-
pendable in Soviet eyes. Adam 111 am concluded, in fact, that it was
entirely possible for Stalin to sacrifice a major conquest like East
Germany without the slightest effect on his position at home or within
the communist bloc. Third, this very Stalinism made it more difficult
for the Western powers to believe in the new flexibility of Soviet
foreign policy. And fourth, that while the process of Stalinist in-
tegration and the open contempt with which Stalin treated East German
interests made it clear that the GDR was in the strictest sense a
satellite of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic was on the other
hand acquiring greater independence almost every day through the
36
process of integration with the West.
In East Germany, like all other Socialist economies, the pace
of reconstruction was appallingly slow. For many years after the war
most of the towns in the country were still, literally, a mass of ruins
In some places the rubble of 1945 was barely cleared ten years later.
Factories and machinery were of course renewed, but it was apparent to
the great mass of workers that the fruit of their labor was going
primarily to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the radio stations
36
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of West Berlin were happily informing them how well the economic
miracle was going in West Germany and what splendid allies the Americans
were. This kind of reporting certainly helped swell the number of
37
refugees and increased the pressures for coercion and repression.
4. Stalin's Note of 1952
It was in this context that Stalin proposed, in a Note which
has since become famous, that the Four powers should, without delay,
'discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany and examine the
question of an all -German government expressing the will of the
German people.' This Note, of March 1952, marked a fundamentally new
departure in Soviet foreign policy. Instead of trying to achieve
some form of German reunification through competition with the West,
and in the context of a long drawn out political struggle, Stalin was
now suggesting that the Four Powers should try to reach agreement.
There are of course any number of ambiguities — for example, the
distinction between discussing the question of what purports to be a
democratically elected government. Equally, it is possible, as many
historians have asserted, that this Note was a motiveless exercise in
Soviet duplicity which the Western powers were quite right to treat
38




Gordon Craig in From Bismark to Adenauer Aspects of German State-
craft
,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965) asserts that the offer probably
was not genuine but that the United States and West Germany were
foolish to reject it out of hand. "For, as one reads the Soviet note
of March 1952, the salient point is not the one over which the
publicists were still arguing after his (Adenauer's) retirement —
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though they carried conviction, were dogmatic and unconvincing. Soviet
diplomacy was extremely active at this time, both before and after
Stalin's death, in attempting to prevent what the Soviet government
was clearly coming to regard as the most dangerous possible consequences
of the division of Germany, namely West German rearmament, 'The time
would come, wrote the Soviet Premier, when Germany would challenge her
former allies even to the extent of waging war against them. This was
39
the inevitable nature of capitalist competition.' Marxism notwith-
standing there were those who agreed with Stalin on the future
possibility of a German threat; among these was a majority of the
French National Assembly which rejected the European Defense Community
Treaty.
The Soviet offer to negotiate a settlement of the German
Question, as expressed in the Note of 1952, appears to have also been
motivated by a desire to isolate West Germany by placing it in a
position of military, if not political, neutrality. The tactic employed
was to offer the German people what they desired most--reunification.
In return the Soviet Union required only a pledge of non-alignment in
40
the Cold War and an acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line.
namely, whether it was a sincere offer or merely an elaborate maneuver-
but rather the fact that the Western powers and their German partner
did not apparently make any serious effort to find out, by exploration
and negotiation, how sincere it might be." pp. 114-115.
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Seemingly, the offer was quite reasonable, but a Federal
Republic divorced from the Atlantic Community would have been exceed-
ingly vulnerable to subversion and eventual absorption into the Soviet
Bloc. There is little possibility that a neutral West German state
could long survive as a buffer between East and West. The Soviet Union
had a great deal to gain and little to lose if the plan was accepted.
This may explain why Stalin was willing to permit elections and even
an investigation, albeit a non-United Nations one, to insure the fair-
ness of the elections.
Nevertheless, there is a real question as to whether the Soviet
proposal was a sincere one or a diplomatic maneuver. There is some
reason to believe the offer was genuine because its acceptance would
have meant the accomplishment of a strategic objective -- the isolation
of West Germany. At the yery worst, the Soviets could always claim a
propaganda victory if their notes were not carefully considered by the
West.
5. Western Rebuff
But what of the cause of reunification? The chances of re-
unifying Germany were seemingly not limited. However, the opportunity
was not taken. The Soviet appeal was frustrated, and a rearmed West
Germany was integrated in the West. The East reacted by doing the
same with the Democratic Republic, thereby perpetuating the danger
that concerned Western planners in the first place.
One question plagues me — did the Western powers really desire
a reunified Germany free to join one bloc or the other? The answer
appears to be in the negative. A Federal Republic can be more easily
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controlled than a unified Germany, And there were certain risks
involved. A reunified Germany would have been subject to Soviet in-
fluence to a far greater extent than to American influence if the
bulk of American troops had gone home. Soviet forces could always
return more quickly than American forces. And if anyone in 1952 had
stopped to observe the consequences of Soviet influence in East Germany,
she could hardly have been blamed for wishing to preserve West Germany
from a similar fate. A calculation of relative risks was, in fact,
involved. It was not a question of balancing the relative risks of a
strong Soviet force stationed perpetually in East Germany against the
risks of a continuing Soviet influence exercised from further afield.
It was a queston of identifying the division of Germany with that of
Europe and of making the straight forward assumption, that so long as
Europe remained divided, German power would be necessary to counter-
balance Soviet power. Thus, as astonishing as it seems to me in retro-
spect, the fact remains that in 1952, Stalin offered the reunification
of Germany, and the Western powers refused,
The difficulty was that, once the Federal government had been
committed to the process of Western integration, any attempt to re-open
the German Question would have postponed that process for the whole of
Western Europe. Stalin's and Malenkov's proposals were obviously a
threat to the chances of the EDC; but they were also a threat, in-
directly at least, to the wider movements toward integration, to
which by now all the governments of the Western European Union
countries were committed, and to which President Eisenhower had given
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his blessing at the moment of his first inauguration in 1952. In the
best of circumstances, it would have been an awkward choice; nonethe-
less there is no disregarding the fact that the Western governments
made the choice, and they decided to live with the division of Germany
which had so alarmed them in the years between 1945 and 1947. In
doing so, they tactitly abandoned the goal of German reunification.
C. POST STALIN
1 . Revolt of 1953 and Its Effect on Reunification
Stalin made his proposal almost exactly a year before he died.
In the last year of his life, conditions continued to deteriorate
drastically inside the GDR, and three months after his death, the
42
East German revolt of 1953 broke out. The tragedy of that event
lay not only in the suppression of the revolt itself, in the use of
tanks against workers whose original demonstrations were inspired by
yet another increase in costs after three years of continual overwork
and inadequate nourishment, nor in the long period of suppression
43
and punishment which followed the rising and the general strike.
It lay also in the fact that East Germany was about to experiment with
41
During this period a primary driving force behind the remilitar-
ization of West Germany was the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster
Dulles. He and Chancellor Adenauer became close personal friends,
which helps account for the close cooperation between the U.S. and the
FRG on the problems of common defense during the Eisenhower years.
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a cautious measure of liberalization at the same time that the Soviet
Union was again showing its willingness to discuss the whole German
question with the Western powers. Both experiments were destroyed by
the revolt. The Central Committee of the SED itself had publicly
declared that the tempo of the 'transition to socialism' had been
false and damaging, and that it had hindered the chances of reunifying
44
Germany. The Soviet government, which had only a few days before
hinted at a possible reconsideration not only of the German question,
but also of the treatment it had previously accorded to Germany, was
concerned above all that it would not bow to force, The costs of
45
goods were raised, a still harsher economic plan was introduced,
Ulbricht's power was made more absolute, and the chances for serious
discussion of German reunification passed.
The attitude of the United States and the other Western powers
was equally revealing. On June 25, 1953, President Eisenhower sent a
message to Chancellor Adenauer in which he expressed deep interest
and concern over the events in East Berlin. Despite such sentiments,
the West remained passive throughout the crisis. Had it threatened
to intervene to halt the Red Army's suppression of the revolt, the
West might have forced concessions from the Soviets. Instead, the
Western powers seemed almost relieved when the disturbances were
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2. Reunification and the Changing Context of Leaders
After the death of Stalin, one of the leading aspirants to
political leadership, Lavrenti Beria, may have been willing to revise
Soviet policy in the direction of sacrificing the East German govern-
ment to the West. Even if this was Beria's desire, the policy shift
did not occur since Beria was eliminated as a contender for power by
his rivals. In fact, the suspicion that he was willing to sacrifice
47
East Germany may have contributed to his demise.
Negotiations within the changing context of leaders continued
at a foreign ministers' conference early in 1954. It is of interest
now because it was the occasion on which the powers came closest to
agreement — and even so the gulf between them was unbridgeable.
Eden demanded free elections throughout Germany as the preliminary to -
a peace treaty, and Molotov agreed — provided that the powers deter-
48
mined before hand what sort of government they would allow to emerge.
This was pehaps less fatuous than it sounds: it indicated the funda-
mental Soviet pre-occupation with security, and with the freedom of
action of any German government. However, no agreement was possible;
and on the question of the European Security Pact -- which Churchill
47
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for the Soviet-Yugoslav break, but like many of Khrushchev's tales this
must be taken with a grain of salt. The same holds true for the stories
that following the East German disturbances in June 1953, Beria
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had proposed as one way of circumventing the related difficulties of
the German problem and the problem of European security -- it was
clear that no progress could be made without a formal renunciation
of the Western attempts to incorporate West Germany into its defense
49
system.
But at the same time, the Soviet Union was clearly determined
to go on trying. In March 1954, — that is, before the final defeat
of the EDC in the French Assembly — the Soviet Union offered to join
50
NATO. Such a momentous offer was clearly intended to convert NATO
into a collective security organization, somewhat along the lines of
51
the 'new Locarno' which Churchill had called for. But if the Soviet
government took Churchill seriously, there is no indication that any
government in the West was prepared to take the Russian offer with
equal seriousness. The whole episode is still somewhat obscure, but
the Soviet suggestion is frequently presented today as a panic reaction
to the imminent prospect that Germany would join NATO, At that stage,
though, there was still no such prospect. It is more likely that, in
the spirit of Churchill's own suggestions, it saw an opportunity here
to combine a solution to the question of European security with a
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The West assumed a passive attitude toward these efforts and
persisted in its policy of integrating the Federal Republic into the
Atlantic Community. The London Conference of Western Foreign Ministers,
from September 28 to October 3, 1954 devised a formula for the arming
of West Germany as a part of the West European Union, which was then
integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Soviet
54bloc countered with the Warsaw Pact the following May. Instead of
creating a general security system for Europe, the alliances of the
East and West divided the continent into two armed camps, There was,
however, one gesture made in the direction of a mutual security
arrangement: West Germany committed itself never to employ force to
achieve reunification.
On October 6, 1954, Foreign Minister Molotov attempted to
stay the course of Western policy with a speech he gave in East Berlin.
He stated that reunification would only occur if Germany were neutralized
and even hinted at acceptance of free elections in return for neutrality.
Should the Federal Republic enter the Western alliance system, the
55
Soviet spokesman continued, there would be no reunification.
Molotov's speech was followed by a Soviet note of October 23,
which called for another four power conference to discuss reunification.
On November 13 the Soviet Union again demanded a European Security
53
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treaty as a means of preventing the rebirth of German militarism. The
United States replied on December 13, that the possibility of reunifica-
tion was now remote, and that France, too, might be threatened by a
56
remilitarized Germany.
In the Fall of 1954, James Bryant Conant, the United States
ambassador to Bonn, wrote that the Western Powers desired German re-
unification, but that the Soviet Union simply would not accept their
57
concept of it,
Winston Churchill had told the House of Commons on March 28,
1950, that a lasting settlement of the German question must be
CO
negotiated while there was still time,, ' By the winter of 1954, that
time had passed. While the Soviet Union might have permitted reunifica-
tion on the basis of free elections provided Germany were to divest
itself of any military alliance with the West, it would neyer agree
to the creation of a Germany free to join the West. The rejection of
neutrality by the West made reunification virtually impossible. So
it developed that, by their very nature, the opposing European alliance
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1 . Change in Sentiment
Between 1952 and 1955, there appeared to be some prospect of
German reunification. After 1955, there was none. There were two
reasons for the sudden change: first the nature of the agreements
reached between the Western powers, and then between East and West,
second, the internal crisis of the opposing blocs after 1955.
It is essential to appreciate the magnitude of the change in
Soviet foreign policy at this time. In 1952, Stalin had sent his
famous note to the Western powers, in which he appeared to propose
some form of German reunification. Its ambiguities and uncertainties
have already been indicated, but, in a sense, the question of whether
Stalin 'meant it 1 is irrelevant. What is to the point is that during
the period which began with this note, Soviet policy was willing to
use the prospect of German reunification as the basis for its relations
with the West. The aim of reunification was acknowledged by both
sides: they differed about the modalities of reunification, about the
political and military context in which it would take place, and about
the character of the German state to emerge. But at least they shared
the fundamental assumption: that the object of their exchanges was
the reunification of Germany.
After 1955, they differed completely in their assumptions and
they have done so ever since. The Western powers still professed to
regard the reunification of the country as their ultimate aim — and
they might have meant it too. But the Soviet Union, under Khrushchev,
40

insisted with undeviating consistancy that the basis for a European
settlement must be the final and universally recognized division of
the country. The division of Germany became a fundamental objective
of Soviet policy at the same time as peaceful co-exi stance.
2. The Geneva Summit Conference, 1955
The Geneva summit meeting illustrates the sharp differences
between the tactics of the communists and the aims of the Western
Allies. The Soviets wished to give priority to the creation of an
inclusive European Security pact and disarmament, and then to consider
the solution of the German question. The West wished to tackle the
concrete and practical issues involved in bringing the two parts of
Germany together. In Geneva, the Soviets agreed that Germany should
be reunited through free elections. They made it clear however that
they thought the arrangement could only be worked out with official
representation of the GDR and the FRG. The conference decided to
study the questions of a security pact for Europe, the limitation of
armaments, and the establishment of a zone in which armed forces would
be disposed by mutual agreement. The decision to explore these matters
led to the meeting of foreign ministers in Geneva in the autumn . The
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3. New Dealings Between Bonn and Moscow (1955-1958)
In May 1955 West Germany entered NATO, and the Warsaw Pact
created a formal Communist military bloc. In that month also the
Austrian peace treaty question was settled, with the Soviet Union
and the West signing a treaty that guaranteed Austrian neutrality.
The Soviets had suddently unfrozen this issue in March by inviting
the Austrian Chancellor to Moscow and offered to sign a draft treaty
more favorable to Austria than the draft treaty the West had agreed
to compromise on. The Soviets were obviously mounting a two-step
political offensive. To Germany, they were, in effect, saying: you
too could gain favorable terms if you would accept neutrality. When
this maneuver failed and Germany entered NATO, the Soviets — through
the Warsaw Pact were saying: Two can play at building positions of
strength. This event marked the beginning of German rearmament and
fin
the definite end of one phase of the negotiations.
Speaking in East Berlin on July 27, 1955, Khrushchev stated
that an "armed West Germany made reunification impossible. The only
feasible way to achieve reunification was for the German states to
accomplish this themselves. However, this does not mean a mechanical
unification of both parts of Germany. The social system of East and
West Germany were too far apart. The workers of the Democratic Party
could hardly be expected to relinquish their political and social






4. Adenauer Visits Moscow
In September Chancellor Adenauer consented to an invitation to
visit Moscow. Adenauer emphasized the German wish for peace, German
unity, and the return of German prisoners of war. The atmosphere at
the talks became increasingly less than cordial. Bulganin said the
prisoner-of-war issue could be discussed only with both German govern-
ments represented. Adenauer took note of the Soviet contention that
the Germans themselves must take the initiative on reunification, and
added that the idea had considerable merit. Then he calmly went on
to say that the trouble was that the Soviet Zone regime did not enjoy
the confidence of its people. By September 12th the conference had
reached an impasse and Adenauer's plane was ready for departure.
5. Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers
The meeting of four foreign ministers was held in Geneva
October 27 -- November 16, 1955. In the interest of European security,
the western powers proposed consideration of the Eden Plan, which
had provisions designed to reassure the Russians with any presumed
danger of German aggression. Foreign Minister Molotov's stated
objections to the plan are summed up as, a) that the sanctions of the
treaty were mere consul tantions, b) that a reunited Germany would be
bound to join NATO. Molotov's objections with regard to the German







at this time reflected an expectation of inevitable progress of a
resurgent and aggressive Germany, devoid of any awareness of the
many basic changes brought by the nuclear age. He expressed firm
belief that the dynamics of German development were a threat to the
exi stance of communism. From these premises, he arrived, by a
logical extension of his Marxian ideas, at the inescapable conclusion
64
that Germany must be communist or divided.
6, In the Wake of Failure
The failure of the meeting meant the closing of the door to
reunification for many years. All subsequent maneuvers were of little
significance, except as they demonstrated the Western powers' deter-
mination not to abandon the principle of freedom for the German
people or to weaken in defense of Berlin or the support of German
democracy.
In the Soviet Union two main events -- the Khrushchev speech
at the Twentieth Congress and the forcible repression of the Polish
and Hungarian uprisings ~ did nothing to alter policy toward Germany.
There was no notable confrontation until 1958. In East Germany steps
were taken to establish a ministry of defense and to build up a
i , 65people s army.
These years were also a time of great improvement in Berlin's







steps toward European economic cooperation. Khrushchev declared the
fifi
new policy of de-Stanlinization in February 1956. The concern of
most Germans for reunification was probably subordinated during this
period to their unceasing involvement in Western policy and commerce.
Ulbricht was worried because of the lag in his economic programs, yet
actively pursuing rearmament with a variety of military formations.
At the same time, contingents of Russian soldiers, estimated at 21
divisions, remained on East German soil.
7. Khrushchev's Battle for Berlin
As Khrushchev became more firmly established in the party and
the government, he enjoyed almost unlimited power. He pressed hard
on the perimeter of his empire and probed for weakness among the
democracies,, He had urged the calling of another summit meeting at
which he hoped his preemi nance would be more conspicuous than it had
been in 1955. Throughout this year there was a running debate between
Khrushchev and Dulles and a notable degree of brinkmanship in the
Far East, Middle East, and elsewhere. As regards Germany, it was the
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8. Intense Diplomatic Activity
That Khrushchev's desire for a summit meeting was related to
the German question was manifest in the series of communications that
started with Premier Bulganin's letter of December 10, 1957 to President
Eisenhower on the Rapacki Plan for neutralizing Central Europe and
Eisenhower's reply of Jan 12, 1958. It continued throughout the
year. There was a period of active diplomatic communications between
Bonn, Washington, Moscow, and elsewhere. These activities were
variously interpreted as pointing up the danger of growing German
strength, indicating a wish on the part of the Soviets to placate a
more active GDR, an increased awareness of the significance of nuclear
weapons, or an intention of capitalizing on the success of Sputnik
and other achievements in the field of missiles and space. Their
divergence from the statement on reunification made at the conclusion
of the Geneva Summit was evident in the proposal for an agreement
between the two German states,, President Eisenhower said that, if
suitable preparations were made, he would be willing to have a meeting
of heads of government.
Consultations preparatory to such a summit were initiated but
bogged down for months when difficulties arose over the agenda These
difficulties were mainly connected with the German issue and a con-







the "security" issues, and the apparent Soviet propaganda efforts.
The summit meeting itself was not scheduled until May 1960, and then
72
it was to be broken up by Khrushchev's angry gesture in leaving Paris.
In September a Soviet note urged early conclusion of a peace
treaty and dealings between the two German states but ignored the
question of free elections. It was therefore rejected by the three
Western powers. This note differed in no essential respect from the
earlier notes, but it emphasized Khrushchev's growing determination
to make gains along the lines he had been pursuing since the Geneva
Conference. All the moves in this attempt to force the Allies to
compromise their position rested on the tacit assumption that Berlin
73
could be used as a pressure point. Tension was mounting.
9 Khrushchev's Ultimatum
In early November 1958, Khrushchev delivered a speech at the
Sports Palace in Moscow which foreshadowed the demands he was to make
on November 27. He said that only the German people, working together
as two separate states, could settle the question of reunification
This statement, following as it did the failure to gain acceptance
for the Rapacki Plan in 1957 and the discussion of an all -German
council in the weeks immediately preceding, occasioned much talk of
the German question in all major capitals. Secretary Dulles was asked
in a press conference what Washington would do if the Soviet personnel
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at the checkpoints were replaced by East Germans. He said that while
Washington would not accept a situation that gave recognition to the
East German regime, it might consider such an arrangement if the
persons at the checkpoints were acting as the agents of the Soviets.
In spite of its probable legal validity, this statement caused con-
74
siderable agitation in Bonn.
These discussions and forewarnings did not prevent the harshly
worded ultimatum of November 27 from coming as a severe shock to the
Western powers. They had no thought however of accepting the ultimatum:
they recognized that if the Kremlin had finally decided to make Berlin
an issue, they would have to stand their ground, whatever the risk.
An immediate press statement made this clear. After the first few
hours of panic, the Berliners showed their understanding of the Allied
position by the speed with which they returned to the savings banks
the funds they had hurriedly withdrawn; and the economy moved on in
high gear. Within a few days Khrushchev showed his understanding of
the Western position by stating at an Albanian Embassy reception that
he had not intended an ultimatum,, The ultimatum itself was not
mentioned again, although the six months' span it had set forth con-
75
tinued to worry some diplomats.
These events brought another change in Soviet tactics.
Khrushchev began to show interest in an invitation to visit Washington.
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He delayed action on a unilateral peace treaty with the GDR.
There was no substantial change in the Berlin situation after 1958
until the Wall. In spite of occasional harassment, access to Berlin
was not seriously disturbed, and, with a feeling of reasonable
security in the city, the economy continued to improve. The Allies,
having shown their firmness, could accept the status quo for years
to come.,
10. The Geneva Conference, 1959
The Geneva meeting beginning in May 1959 brought no agreement
and no change in the German situation,, Although the Russians had
been offered a greater opportunity than they realized, no substantial
ground was lost to them.
On June 16 the West proposed a limitation of the garrison to
11,000 men, reduction of the garrison if "developments were to permit,"
conditional East German control over access to Berlin, and a curb on
intelligence and propaganda in the city. The various proposals
offered were however rejected by Gromyko. The final Soviet proposals
were a repeat of the earlier recommendations. Had Gromyko accepted
the Western proposals, West Berlin's hope of survival would have
been destroyed.
The battle for Berlin, which was in fact the battle for
Germany, tapered off as Khrushchev looked to Washington and his coming
visit. His talks with Eisenhower outside Washington, which have been
frequently regarded as leading to a relaxation of tensions called the
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"spirit of Camp David" did not in fact bring any changes in Russian
policy toward Germany. The last years of the Republican Administra-
tion were relatively undisturbed as Khrushchev, interested in Cuba,
Africa, and the .Middle East, strove to expand his foreign relations
78
and twice appeared in the United Nations (1959, 1960). The ulti-
matum served on the Western powers and the threat of a unilateral
peace treaty melted away. There was an appearance of harmony and
acceptance of the status quo until after the American elections in
November 1960.
11. The Wall
The changing of the guard when John F. Kennedy took over
the leadership in Washington naturally led to curiosity and excite-
ment on both sides, Kennedy was eager to meet with Khrushchev and
to take his measure. The Soviet chairman for his part wished to
test the firmness of the new young man. The meeting was scheduled
for Vienna in early June. The American President had expressed his
optimism as he started his journey, but the talks in Vienna left him
depressed and apprehensive. Before the 1961 meeting in Vienna ended,
Khrushchev presented Kennedy a note similar in some respects to that
of November 1958. Earlier, on his return from Paris through East
Berlin in 1960, Khrushchev had again spoken of a separate peace








Worried about Laos, shocked by the misadventure in Cuba, and
distressed by his failure to make any constructive moves with Khrushchev,
Kennedy did not present to the world the strong image that was later
to be his. Weeks elapsed between his receipt of the note and the re-
jection of the Soviet demands on July 17. The American reply reempha-
sized the priority of German reunification and self-determination. In
a news conference on July 19, and in a speech on July 25, Kennedy
80
stressed the importance of the Western military presence in Berlin.
It was at this time that he referred to the protection of West Berlin,
ignoring the fact that four-power rights applied to all four sectors
of Greater Berlin. Meanwhile, for a variety of reasons, fear mounted
and the outflow of refugees from the Zone increased to proportions not
witnessed since 1953. The flight from the GDR was discussed by several
American senators, in a manner which left doubt as to the clarity and
81
firmness of the position in Washington.
Built in the week beginning August 13, 1961, the Wall was an
82
expression of Soviet readiness to support Ulbricht. It has also an
indication of Soviet calculation of the possibility of defying the
American government with impunity. Some have concluded that American
inaction at the Wall led to the missile crisis over Cuba a year later.
The Wall creates a situation for East Germany which does not
exist in any other Warsaw Pact nation. It constitutes a visible ex-
pression of communist policy from which it will be difficult to retreat.
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The manner in which it will be eliminated will tax the ingenuity of
the men in the Kremlin.
At the same time the Wall represents a major Soviet concession
to Ulbrichto It could not have been established in any period where
the Allied position was recognized as firm and might have been beyond
Ulbricht's reach after Kennedy's stand in the Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962 had caused the communists to make a new assessment of his will.
Not until the confrontation in 1962 was Khrushchev persuaded that the
West was still determined to maintain its strong position in Germany.
12. Further Developments
The year 1964 saw some rather important developments. On June
12th the Soviets signed a treaty with the German Democratic Republic,
which was, in effect, a substitute for the separate peace so long
threatened by Khrushchev. Because the Soviets did not attempt by it
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to terminate Western rights, it put the end to the Second Berlin Crisis.
In that year, too, American relations with West Germany were in dis-
repair as the West German government hesitated over signing the 1963
Test Ban Treaty (which had become possible through the detente following
the Cuban Missile Crisis). The West Germans were concerned over avoid-
ing any implication of de facto recognition of the GDR if both Germanies
ratified. What actually worried them far more was the fear that the
new American— Soviet accord might be consolidated at the expense of
84
German reunification. However, the treaty was ratified on 1 December.







sudden overthrow of Khrushchev again delayed the likelihood of immediate
serious moves.
E. BREZHNEV ERA
1 . Brezhnev Doctrine
From 1964 to 1971 there was no indication that Soviet policy
shifted from the basic demands: (1) the recognition of the reality of
two German states, (2) the recognition of the separate character of
West Berlin as a political entity, (3) the recognition that reunifica-
tion is a matter to be resolved between the two German states. For
example, the "communique of the Bucharest Conference" of the Warsaw
Pact in 1966 emphasized the importance of the recognition of the
or
existing borders in Europe and the reality of two German states.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslavakia in 1968 underscored in a
most dramatic manner the importance the Soviet Union attaches to the
prevention of the destruction of Marxist-Leninist governments through-
out Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union moved to protect its ideological
core interests in Czechoslavakia from disintegration into a plural
political system. The development of the so called Brezhnev Doctrine,
which the Soviet Union used to justify intervention in a socialist
nation "to prevent counterrevolution," indicates the importance the
Soviet Union attaches to the preservation of ideologically correct
regimes in Eastern Europe
.
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The Dubcek interlude was particularly ominous for Ulbricht —
not only was reform socialism anathema to him and his political
longevity, but Czechoslavakia's eagerness to deal with "established"
forces within the FRG was a challenge to the legitimacy of the GDR.
If Eastern Europe were willing to interact with Bonn before the FRG's
prior recognition of the GDR, this would further challenge the GDR's
legitimacy. The USSR and the GDR were partners in containing the
spread of the Prague spring; the invasion of Czechoslavakia represented
a defeat of West German bridge building OSTPOLITIK and a reinforcement
QC.
of Ulbricht's influence in Moscow.
2. Foreboding Signals
After the invasion, signs began to appear that signaled dis-
sention between the USSR and the GDR over policy toward the FRG, The
Soviet decision to respond favorably to West German initiatives for
normalizing relations in 1969 precipitated a two year crisis in USSR-
GDR relations. While it had been a consistant Soviet goal since 1955
to secure Western ratification of the post war division of Germany,
the USSR was willing to compromise on the issue of de facto versus de
jure recognition by the FRG of the GDR. This was linked to other major
Soviet problems: the desire to revitalize a dialogue with the U.S.,









With the coming of Brandt to power in 1969, the FRG ceased to
pursue a revisionist policy toward Eastern Europe: instead of seeking
to change the postwar status quo, Brandt agreed to accept it on Soviet
terms. The West German willingness to accept a de facto East German
state, the agreement to sign a non-proliferation treaty and to ratify
the postwar European boundries (Oder-Neisse Line) argued for better
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ties between West Germany and the USSR,
3. Soviet Leadership and the GDR
After the signing of the Soviet-West German Treaty in August,
1972, it became clear that Ulbricht was non-plussed about the Soviet
compromise on the recognition question, Ulbricht was adamant about
the need to end all West German links with West Berlin; his recal-
citrance about supporting the Brezhnev position on rapprochement
undoubtedly contributed to his early retirement. When the situation
became critical, the USSR could still exercise the power to control
events in the GDR. Since that time, East Germany, under Erich Honecker,
has been more circumspect about contumely behavior in the fact of
Soviet Westpolitik and there has not been any open conflict since the
89
Ulbricht altercation.
The GDR is, according to Foreign Minister Gromyko, "an important
outpost of socialism on Eastern Europe's western border," East Germany
is extremely important to Soviet security in Europe, but it is not
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could not survive as a state without the aid of Soviet control. This
is because the GDR, unlike Poland or Czechoslavakia, lacks legitimacy
as a nation, as well as a communist state. It's relationship with the
Soviet Union is central to its viability, its economic stability, and
the maintenance of its position in the Warsaw Pact. The continued
90division of Germany is the vital issue for the GDR.
However, the USSR has lost influence among citizens in the GDR
in the last decade. Since 1972, the GDR's international recognition
and its 1975 entry into the United Nations has elevated East Germany
91
from a pariah state to a nation with international legitimacy. Prior
to 1972, it had diplomatic relations with 30 states; now 126 states
92
recognize it. The establishment of East Germany's international
legitimacy has, to some degree, liberated it from total Soviet control,
however, there are limits. It is one of the USSR's loyal proxies in
the UN and the world.
4. Honecker Takes Over
Since Erich Honecker replaced Ulbricht and cooperated with
Soviet politics, he has sought to increase the degree of integration
between the GDR and the USSR as a way of combating debilitating effects
of intra-German normalization. The 1975 treaty promises closer cooper-
ation between East European countries and the USSR, based on Marxist—
90
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Leninism and the "Brezhnev Doctrine." However, this treaty conspicuously
omits commitment to German reunification, although two previous treaties
93
mentioned it. Also the 1974 GDR constitution obviates any mention
of German unity and speaks instead of the "inviobility of borders."
The treaty also claims that "West Berlin is not a constituent part of
the FRGo" It stresses the basic view now held by the GDR and the USSR;
that is, both sides share a fundamental commitment to the division of
94
Germany and to the separation of West Berlin from the FRG.
5 Brute Force
The most visible and ultimately the most important forced re-
minder of Soviet power over the GDR are the 20 Soviet divisions stationed
on the East German soil. This ensures control not only over the GDR's
army, but also over its population, and is a constant reminder of the
potential costs to the GDR of any challenge to Soviet policy. Moreover,
the GDR government presumably welcomes the presence of Soviet troops
as a deterrent to East German domestic unrest, so evident in a neigh-
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boring state.
The six divisions of GDR National Peoples' Army is supposed to
compliment the Soviet divisions in the GDR. However, one might wonder
about the fundamental morale of the NVA. If a war were to break out
in Europe, would East German soldiers be willing to take up arms against
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any of the other Soviet satellite military forces. It is doubtful that
East Germans soldiers would support the rapacious instincts of the
Soviets and the orders of their Soviet-chosen German leaders.
The growing gap between living standards in the USSR and GDR
is a source of increasing concern to Moscow. As a result of detente,
East Germans have more contacts with West Germans. Since 85% of the
GDR population watches West German television, they are constantly
impressed by the high standard of living the West Germans enjoy. This
places extra pressure on the East German government to stress consump-
tion, and consumer spending is twice as high in the GDR than in the
USSR. This voracious consumption is visible to Soviet troops. The
Soviet Union may have to choose between discontent within Eastern
Europe over the GDR's privileged position and the need to keep the
GDR happy by allowing its population to experience an affluent way of
96
life unmatched in any other socialist country.
The most pressing problem facing the GDR leadership since 1949
has been the inability to develop a separate socialist German national
identity. The fact is, there is another thriving German state with a
different socio-political system acting as a strong magnet to the East
German population and is an additional source of instability for Honecker's
government. Many Western analysts question whether the GDR has been
able to inculcate in its population a national identity separate from
that of West Germany. An AED poll of people between 16 and 25 revealed





Moreover, although the GDR constitution has dropped all references to
reunification, a West German public opinion poll seems to refute this
97
claim„ Reunification is not dead in the minds of the German populace,
it has just been incarcerated in an eastern bloc.
In January 1978, the West German magazine Per Speigel published
a letter of a putative dissenting group within the SED. Among other
things the group called for reunification "...we are for an aggressive
national policy that seeks the reunification of Germany with social
democrats, socialists, and democratic communists holding a majority
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over conservative forces." The sensibilities expressed in the
letter represent a current of opinion which suggests that the reunifica-
tion issue remains unresolved. Of course, the USSR denounced the
letter as fabrication by the revanchist West Germans.
As long as the GDR remains the military and economic bulwark
of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, its domestic tensions are of
secondary importance to the USSR. On the other hand, if the lack of
domestic legitimacy begins to threaten the GDR's communist party, then
Moscow may have to reconsider its attitude. Moscow fears that the
inner-German rapprochement may in the long run develop an independent






III. THE EFFECTS OF OSTPOLITIK/WESTPOLITIK ON THE
REUNIFICATION ISSUE
In 1968 Willy Brandt expressed the West German policy of negotiation
and mutual assistance (which was later to become known as OSTPOLITIK,
or policy toward the East) as follows:
The Federal Republic of Germany has a vital interest in
achieving a peaceful balance in Europe. The Germans would in-
evitably be drawn into any armed conflict between East and West.
They would be the first to experience the devastation. Their
national existence would be at stake: the accumulation of troops,
military equipment and atomic means of destruction in the small
area of Germany is unique in the world. So for this reason, too,
our primary aim must be the safeguarding of peace in Europe. All
other problems, including that of German partition, are sub-
ordinate to this aim.
The keystones of our policy are: reduction of tensions,
improvement of relations and preparatory contributions to a
European peace settlement. Our geographical position gives us
a special responsibility. For centuries, Germany has acted as
a bridge between eastern and western Europe. We want to try
and rebuild bridges which have been destroyed. This is why we
want to work together with our eastern neighbors, who share
this ambition, in all fields of economic, cultural and— if
possible-- political lifej
OSTPOLITIK requires of West Germany a daring policy of initiative
and movement toward the East, marked by realism, patience and deter-
mination. Its policy may be bearing fruit today— in the restraint
the Soviets have thus far shown in Poland.
When West Germany joined NATO in 1955, the allies undertook a
formal commitment to pursue German reunification in negotiations with
the Communist bloc. The formula then envisaged involved a bold
Willy Brandt, Willy Brandt— People and Politics The Years I960-
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negotiation between East and West. But Chancellor Adenauer's Eastern
2
policy was essentially negative. By the 1970' s, the conditions af-
fecting Germany's position had greatly changed. The commitment to
reunification remains, but Germany has adopted a formula in which re-
unification is seen as occurring as the result of a long-run process of
bridge-building between East and West -- the policy of 0STP0LITIK.
This chapter will attempt to define 0STP0LITIK, its bases, its
advances, its nuances, and its inextricable linkage to the problem of
German reunification.
A. 0STP0LITIK DEFINED— LONG AND SHORT TERM GOALS
0STP0LITIK, by whomever in Bonn it is defined, has two main com-
ponents. First, it seeks an improvement of the Federal Republic's
relations with the USSR in a manner which persuades the Soviets that
the division of Germany is neither durable or in the Soviet interest.
That is, of course, a Promethean undertaking since the minimum goal of
Soviet policy in Europe is to preserve the status quo; and Moscow
views any attempt to alter it by outside forces as a violent attack on
its vital interests.
The second component of 0STP0LITIK is to improve relations with
the states of Eastern Europe, including East Germany* Exploiting the
powerful interest of Eastern Europe in economic ties with Europe's
most prosperous state, the Federal Republic attempts to demonstrate to
them that the division of Europe and Germany is not worth the sacrific
it necessitates.
2
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B. INCEPTION OF OSTPOLITIK
It was only in September 1955 that the Federal Republic opened
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and this was as far as
Chancellor Adenauer was willing to go, believing that the Soviet Union
could only be forced to make concessions over the reunification of
Germany through Western strength and a policy of rigidity. Settlement,
in his view, had to precede real detente. He was opposed to summit
conferences at which the West always seemed to be making all the con-
cessions and in which the Federal Republic could not participate to
defend her interests. Adenauer's posture tended merely to assure that
3
the German Problem would be removed from the agenda of detente.
The post-Adenauer governments: Erhard, the Grand Coalition, Brandt,
and Schmidt, have sought to assure, by their activism toward the East
that, at the very least, the German Problem would remain a salient
aspect of the many efforts of East and West to order their relations.
To do this they had to make the rather painful admission that a German
settlement could only come as a result of gradual and far-reaching
accommodation between East and West in which the Federal Republic
actively participated.
Though the first signs of a change in West Germany's OSTPOLITIK
occurred as early as 1965, the participation of the SPD in the Grand
Coalition from the end of 1966 was the main factor in bringing about
3
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the change. In all the West German political parties, second thoughts
were being given to OSTPOLITIK. The main cause was the apparent failure
of Adenauer's policy— a policy of rigidity had not borne the expected
fruit and Bonn's two most important allies, the United States and France,
no longer seemed to support the German policy beyond giving it lip
5
service. Since by the mid-1960's the Federal Republic had already
emerged as an economic giant while still playing the part of a political
pygmy; it is not surprising to see the change occur at this time.
The German initiative began with an announcement on February 24,
1965 that Kosygin had been invited to visit the Federal Republic. The
next move was Erhard's Peace Note of March 25th, 1966, which, besides
general proposals concerning nuclear weapons, also indirectly raised
the possibility of agreements on the prohibition of the use of force
in disputes between West Germany and the various East European govern-
ments. On December 13th Kiesinger, as Chancellor heading the new
Grand Coalition, called for improved relations with Eastern Europe but
specific reference was made to Poland and Czechoslovakia rather than
to the Soviet Union. In October, 1967, Brandt, as Foreign Minister,
called for "sincere friendship" between West Germany and the Soviet
Union and offered to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of
force. In April 1968, in response to a Soviet demand that similar
5
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agreements be concluded with the GDR, West Germany offered to exchange
declarations on the renunciation of the use of force with all Warsaw
Pact states. In June 1968, Brandt met the Soviet Ambassador to East
Germany for a long discussion on German-Soviet relations and in
October, only one and a half months after the Warsaw Pact invasion of
o
Czechoslovakia, he spoke with Gromyko in New York. Nevertheless,
these first steps remained within strict limits, since the major part-
ners in both Erhardt's government and the Grand Coalition, the CDU/CSU,
were not prepared to recognize the Oder-Neisse boundary and the GDR,
nor sign the Non-Profileration Treaty which seemed to be the price
demanded by the Soviet Union for a real relaxation in Soviet-German
g
relations.
C. THE SOVIET REACTION
The Soviet reaction to West Germany's new OSTPOLITIK was at first
quite discouraging. Erhard's invitation to Kosygin at the beginning
of 1965 to visit Bonn was turned down and the Peace Note of March 1966
was quickly brushed aside as meaningless. The Bucharest Declaration
of July 1966 still singled the Federal Republic out as the main obstacle
to a European settlement, and at the end of 1966 and the beginning of
1967 the Soviet Union made a great fuss about the danger of neo-Nazism
in West Germany while claiming the right to intervene in the event of









The main purpose of the Soviet policy toward West Germany seemed to be
to derive the maximal concessions from the Federal Republic in exchange
for any significant improvement of relations and, as has already been
pointed out, the Federal Republic was not prepared at this juncture to
grant them. Yet there were other reasons for the initial cool recep-
tion. As the wild accusations against the Federal Republic on its
"role" in the liberalization of Czechoslovakia during 1968 showed,
West Germany was still a useful scapegoat and an excuse for Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe. No doubt it was also difficult for the
Soviet Union to change its attitude which for many years had seen West
Germany as the main threat in Europe to Soviet interests, particularly
as long as the Christian Democrats were still the main party in power
in Bonn. East German pressure must also have acted as a barrier to
any Soviet interest which might have existed for improving relations
with West Germany, while the prospect of West Germany gaining access
to nuclear weapons through some form of NATO arrangement caused worry
in the Kremlin.
In return for her more flexible OSTPOLITIK, the Federal Republic
received a good deal of frustration and discouragement and was made
aware of the fact that she would have to make major policy concessions
in order to reach the same sort of "normal" relations with the Eastern
bloc as Britain and France already enjoyed. Her main achievement was
an impressive increase in trade with the Soviet Union after a period







balance of payments position, however, this trade increase was of much
lesser importance to her than a similar increase would have been in the
case of Britain. Even with her increased share of Western economic
contacts with the East, West Germany was still a very far way from
being able to use her economic power for political ends.
D WEST GERMAN INITIATIVES 1969-72
A long term aim of the Federal Republic's OSTPOLITIK has always
been to foster conditions which would enable an eventual reunification
of Germany. Adenauer believed that this could only be achieved from a
position of strength and a policy of no compromises which would force
the Soviet Union to give up her grip on East Germany. The Social
Democrats felt that this policy had simply led to a growing rift between
the two Germanies and their 'citizens'. This stagnant policy had to be
stopped. What Willy Brandt wished to achieve was the reduction of
tension between West Germany on the one hand and the Soviet Union and
the Eastern bloc on the other in order that the latter might place
pressure on the GDR to be more flexible in its policy toward the Federal
Republic. The longer run aim was to see the gradual dissolution of the
12
two military alliances facing each other in Europe, followed by the
disintegration of the two blocs and a realignment of forces in Central
Europe which would enable the eventual reunification of Germany within
a broader framework of improved intra-European relations.
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The timing of the more intensive German effort has two basic
explanations. The first is that by the end of 1969, the SPD became,
for the first time in almost 40 years, the major partner in a coalition
whose other members, the FDP, also favored the new approach to
1
3
OSTPOLITIK. Secondly, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the
Soviet Union showed herself increasingly receptive to West Germany's
overtures for a variety of reasons.
The most important manifestation of West Germany's new OSTPOLITIK
was her willingness to recognize the status quo in Central and Eastern
Europe as demanded by the Soviet Union and the other East European
states, and her accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Federal
Republic realized that the mere expression of a desire to improve re-
lations was not sufficient. The eventual benefits to be gained were
considered more important than the immediate concessions the Federal
Republic made the Soviet Union. These concessions were made in rapid
15
succession, mostly after the SPD—FDP Coalition was elected into office.
The first step concerning the de facto recognition of the GDR
occurred in April 1969 when Brandt announced West German willingness
in principle to take part in the Soviet proposed European Security
Conference without conditioning her participation on the absence of
13





The 1969 election marked a milestone in the history of the Federal
Republic, it was the first time the SPD attained enough Bundestag
seats to form a coalition government with the FDP.
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the GDR -- this was the first time that the Federal Republic had dropped
its traditional refusal to attend an international gathering at which
the East Germans would also be present. The next step, in March 1970,
was Brandt's first official meeting with the East German premier, Willi
Stoph, which took place in Erfurt. Despite the absence of any concrete
result, this meeting implied a further withdrawal from the West German
refusal to recognize the GDR. Following the Four-Power Agreement of
September 3rd, 1971, on the status of Berlin, discussions opened between
the representatives of both Germanies to work out the actual elections
of November 1972 (which increased the majority of the SPD/FDP Coalition.
The treaty on the basic relative normalization in the relations between
the Federal Republic and the GDR was signed on December 21st, opening
the road to a relative normalization in the relations between the two
German states.
As soon as Brandt became chancellor he signed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty as the Soviet Union had long pressed Bonn to do, an act for which
they expressed their appreciation. By 1970 negotiations between West
Germany and the Soviet Union had advanced sufficiently for Walter Scheel
,
the West German Foreign Minister, to pay a visit to Moscow, followed in
August by the Chancellor's trip to Moscow for the official signing of
the Treaty on the Renunciation of the use of Force. By this treaty,
West Germany undertook "to respect the territorial integrity of all
states in Europe within their existing frontiers." The specific issue
Keefe, Eugene K. , Area Handbook for the Federal Republic of Germany ,





of the Oder-Neisse boundary between Germany and Poland was settled in
the December 7th West-German-Polish treaty. Soon after the Berlin
agreement was signed Brandt visited Brezhnev in the Crimea to discuss
various European problems. It was only on May 17, 1972 that the treaties
with the Soviet Union and Poland were finally ratified by the Bundestag.
Once the ratifications had taken place, the suspense which had sur-
rounded the new OSTPOLITIK was over, and except for a settlement with
Czechoslovakia, which was delayed by West Germany's refusal to declare
the Munich Agreement of 1938 null and void, the initiating phase of
1
8
Brandt's policy had come to an end.
E. SOVIET REACTION TO THE LATER STAGES OF OSTPOLITIK
Before looking at the Soviet reaction to West Germany's diplomatic
offensive it is important to note that during this period the former's
interest in detente was constantly rising and that consequently the
climate for cooperation between the West Europeans and the Soviet Union
had become increasingly favorable. The most obvious reason for the
Soviet interest in detente were: a) her own economic problems and the
growing technological gap between herself and the West in the non-
military field; b) her difficulties with China at a time when the latter
had managed to climb out of the near isolation imposed upon her in the
past by the United States. The manifestations of the Soviet interest
in detente were her rapidly expanding trade and cooperation agreements
18
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Figure 5. Map of Postwar Boundaries
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with the West, the convening of a Conference on European Security which
she herself initiated, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the
United States, and most important from the point of view of this study,
a fundamental shift in the Soviet attitude toward West Germany which
meant the acceptance of West Germany rather than regarding it as a
19
menace to European security and Soviet interests.
After the initially discouraging reception to West Germany's new
OSTPOLITIK during the year 1966-69, the Soviets began to show ever-
increasing interest in the 1970's, Many explanations have been offered
for the Soviet policy shifts at that particular time. First of all,
there was the desire, soon after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, to
play down the whole episode and wipe out the initial detrimental effect
which it had had- on the prospects of detente. Since West Germany had
been the main scapegoat for the invasion it was primarily that state
which the Soviet Union felt should be pacified. The desire to expand
economic and technological contacts with the Federal Republic, seen
within the context of Russia's broader economic interests, was another
reason. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union also tried to help
the SPD win the 1969 election so that it might form a government with-
out the CDU/CSU, for she was well aware of the fact that only a govern-
ment led by the SPD would be willing to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, recognize the Oder-Neisse line and agree to establish official
relations with the GDR
19
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In February 1969, the Soviet Union offered Bonn positive concessions
on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the form of strong assurances that
she had no intention of intervening in West Germany as she had previously
20
claimed the right to do. A week later a statement concerning the
West German Presidential elections in West Berlin was made by the
Russians but the subject was greatly played down despite East German
efforts to the contrary. On March 12th, a summit conference of the
Warsaw Pact which met in Budapest dropped the usual vindictive denuncia-
tion of West German militarism and called for a European Security
21
Conference to deal with the German Problem. At the 50th Anniversary
of the Comintern the Soviet Union condemned the Stalinist denunciation
of the German Social Democratic Party. In July 1969, Gromyko expressed
Moscow's interest in improving the situation of West Berlin which was
taken to mean an agreement to formalize the city's status in a way not
wholly detrimental to West German interests. In December the Moscow
Summit Conference of Warsaw Pact leaders sanctioned bilateral negotia-
tions with Bonn which the Warsaw Foreign Ministers Conference of February
1967 had condemned. In 1970, came the negotiations between the Soviet
Union and West Germany leading to the Treaty of Renunciation of the
Use of Force, followed by a brief meeting between Gromyko and Scheel
near Frankfurt in October 1970 and the Berlin Agreement in June 1972,
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Whether West Germany actually got anything in return for her conces-
sions to the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc is a question which has
been debated extensively. It is difficult to evaluate the long run
returns since insufficient time has gone by. The most visible achieve-
ment has been West Germany's extraordinary expansion of trade, making
her the most important Western trading partner of the Eastern bloc
(this will be covered more extensively in another chapter). There
have, however, been many less obvious achievements. In the first place
the Federal Republic is no longer the target of vicious propaganda
attacks accusing her of aggressive plans and revanchism. An accord on
Berlin was signed, and although it was not agreed that West Berlin
formed an integral part of the Federal Republic, at least West German
rights in the city and those of the citizens of West Berlin were de-
fined and officially recognized by the Soviet Union as well as the GDR.
The next achievement was that the Soviet Union more or less forced a
grudging East Germany to begin settling its relations with the Federal
Republic, despite the fact that the latter was unwilling to concede
that the two German states were foreign to each other.
For his part, Ulbricht, in his unrelenting opposition to Soviet
WESTPOLITIK and to any German rapprochement, was isolated from the
other East European leaders. He was convinced that only under con-
ditions of permanent confrontation could he maximize his leverage
over Moscow and erode the Western position in Berlin. His ultimate
goal was to liquidate the four-power status of Berlin, and the Soviet
willingness to begin Quadripartite negotiations on Berlin threatened
his core policy goal. Although the USSR may well have shared this
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ultimate aim vis a vis Berlin, in the short term, Ul orient was obstructing
Moscow's rapprochement with Bonn a Although it is possible Ulbricht was
removed from power for domestic political reasons, particularly because
of the failure of economic reforms, the fact that both the Berlin and
the intra-German negotiations only made progress after his resignation
in May 1971 indicates that the USSR played a role in his retirement.
Since 1971, East Germany has been more circumspect in its reaction to
Soviet WESTPOLITIK and there has not been any open conflict similar to
that between 1969 and 1971. This has thus also been a gain for West
23
Germany.
Besides the Treaty on the Renunciation of the Use of Force with the
Soviet Union, the actual value of which (as opposed to its symbolic
value) is arguable, an agreement was signed on July 22nd for the opening
of the West German Consul tate in Leningrad and a Soviet one in Hamburg
in November 1971; and it was finally agreed that Luftansa would fly to
Moscow via West Berlin. West Germany now has full diplomatic relations
with all the Warsaw Pact members, and having joined the United Nations
together with East Germany, her position in the international system
has been normalized to the greatest extent possible and will enable her
24
to play a much more active and independent role in world affairs.
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F. INITIATIVES FROM 1973-1975
The initiating phase of West Germany's OSTPOLITIK actually came to
an end in 1972 though relations with Czechoslovakia were normalized in
December 1973. Brezhnev paid a much heralded official visit to West
Germany in May 1973 at Brandt's invitation, and East Germany opened
her official mission in Bonn in May 1974. In 1973 more important
economic agreements were made while trade increased at a fast pace, with
the Soviet Union showing a particular interest in expanding it even
further by getting the reluctant West Germans to sign a yery long term
economic agreement. German reluctance to sign such an agreement re-
sulted from unwillingness to become too closely tied economically to
the Soviet Union and from the actual limits of what the Soviet Union
25
could offer the Federal Republic in return for her purchases. On
October 1st, 1973 the first supplies of Soviet natural gas began to
flow to West Germany by a pipeline running through Czechoslovakia,
but by the beginning of 1974 the Soviet Union had fallen down on agreed
oil deliveries. After the latter had also raised her price of crude
oil West Germany's main oil company, Veba, cancelled its Russian contract
Both this setback and the refusal of the Bundestag to approve cheap
export credits for the Soviet Union in March 1974 were the first in-
dications that, although German-Soviet relations would not be allowed
to deteriorate to their previous state, the road would henceforth not





Republic became increasingly disenchanted with OSTPOLITIK, feeling
that too many domestic problems had been making concessions without
any visible returns. By the beginning of 1974 it could also be pointed
out that the GDR was stalling on any real relaxation in its relations
with the Federal Republic while the Soviet Union seemed in no mood to
press its ally and despite the Berlin Agreement was herself raising
difficulties concerning Bonn's prerogatives in West Berlin. Brandt's
resignation over the Guillaume spy affair in May 1974, the withdrawal
of Egon Bahr, the master architect of OSTPOLITIK, from the front bench
of the SPD, and the accession to the Chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt
who had never been as enthusiastic as Brandt about OSTPOLITIK, seemed
to put a pallor on OSTPOLITIK for the time being.
G. THE TRANSITION FROM BRANDT STYLE OSTPOLITIK TO SCHMIDT STYLE
OSTPOLITIK
Brandt's OSTPOLITIK was powered in part by the sincere motive to
strike with Germany's former victims in the East the same "reconcilia-
tion" that Adenauer had effected with the West. It was powered partly
also by the plausible tactical motive that, given the unfolding detente
negotiations with Moscow by the Nixon Administration, the FRG might as
well stage some gambits of its own lest it be completely outflanked by
27
a comprehensive accord between the two superpowers.
But there was also a larger conception behind OSTPOLITIK — one
that was purveyed by the man most responsible for the policy's
27
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implementation: Egon Bahr, Brandt's long time close associate and his
chief negotiator in the East. Bahr envisaged a broad German strategy
vis-a-vis the East that would lead over various accommodations in-
cluding: the East-West force withdrawals; the dissolution of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact; and the creation of an essentially neutralized Central
28
Europe under the guise of a Collective Security System. From Bahr's
strongly nationalistic vantage point, the purpose of this vast re-
vamping process--which the FRG would subtly engineer with the grudging
tolerance of the superpowers—would be to set the stage for a reunion
of the two Germanies, in fact, if not in formality,
Bahr relinquished the controls of OSTPOLITIK when Helmut Schmidt
took over as Chancellor in 1974. Today, as Secretary-General of the
SPD he continues to play a powerful role on the Bonn stage, even if
not in the day to day deliberations of the Schmidt government. And he
has given ample indication that although he may have modified the time
frame of his expectations, by no means has he given up his basic vision
of a future Europe.
Helmut Schmidt represents the conservative wing of the SPD. He
is essentially a pragmatist with a basic pro-West orientation. But
Schmidt is not immune to some of the traditional ideological under-
currents in the SPD: for example, a certain abnegation vis-a-vis power
politics, especially nuclear politics and strong and consistent emphasis
on arms control as the preferred road to the gradual dismantling of
the power blocs in Europe.
28
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Nor is Schmidt immune to an occasional wistfulness that mirrors
at least vague outlines of the Bahr concept. Thus, in a much discussed
private dinner speech in March, 1979 where, in the presence of the
U. S. Ambassador to Bonn, Schmidt mused about the long range future
29
of Europe, The picture he painted was one similar to the last
century—meaning, he said, a "cross-fertilization" of all European
cultures, feelings once again of belonging to each other. He averred
that obviously Germany would be the great benefactor because it could
be reunited again in one house.
Another vociferous voice in the call for OSTPOLITIK is the SPD's
chief ideologue, Herbert Wehner. Throughout the period of OSTPOLITIK,
Wehner has been the foremost advocate of a reconciliation between East
and West—of Western Europe and the Communist Bloc, and most especially
31
of West and East Germany.
Although Brandt cut Wehner out when Brandt negotiated the present
SPD-Free Democrat Coalition, Wehner has retained tremendous influence
in the SPD, particularly among the young, as party whip in the
Bundestag. He has stormy relations with Schmidt, but the Chancellor
makes no major decisions without consulting him. Above all, Germany's
OSTPOLITIK was to a large degree dependent on Wehner.
29
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Wehner, although 74, will continue to push for an accommodation
with the Communists in any Schmidt- led government. The question is
whether the Russians can meet him halfway.
For his part, Schmidt is flirting with neutralist solutions to
European problems. Schmidt has called for a freeze on deployment of
the next generation of "theater nuclear weapons" by both Americans
and the Soviets. The agreement was that the U.S. should continue to
prepare for the deployment of the Pershing II missiles and GLCMs while
trying to negotiate a European Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR)
at talks in Vienna. Schmidt says that the purpose is to get negotia-
tions going again between the U.S and Moscow after Washington's refusal
to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) following the
Afganistan invasion. And it is clear he sees himself going to Moscow
33
as a middleman.
Yet, for all the logic and precision of Schmidt's pronouncements,
it is clear that his freeze proposal has political implications that
go beyond its actual language.
His new position is meant to curry favor with his own party's left
wing, which as early as 1959 evolved a "Deutschland Plan" aimed at
34
neutralizing West Germany. It has evidently placated party leaders
such as Herbert Wehner, who has at times, criticized Schmidt, arguing
33
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that the Soviet military build-up in Central Europe is "essentially
defensive."
Schmidt's new line offers the Soviets an opening to divide the U.S.
further from its NATO allies. In a propaganda stunt, Moscow unilaterally
withdrew 20,000 superannuated forces from the Central European front.
The Russians are expected to resurrect their proposal for an "all Europe
Energy Conference" hinting that the Soviets would help ensure access by
Western Europe—and particularly energy short West Germany-- to a stable
35
supply. The proposed natural gas pipeline is a big step in this
direction. The implication, of course, is that the u\S. no longer is
capable of guaranteeing Mideast oil to European customers. And, as
Schmidt has acknowledged on more than one occasion, Moscow always has
one important card—the 17 million Germans living under a Communist
regime in East Germany.
Large segments of the European body politic see war, not subservience
to the Soviet Union, as the main threat; that is one important reason
for the German pressure on Schmidt for negotiations at any price.
The recent Polish unrest has put some new kinks in 0STP0LITIK and
intro-German relations. Initially, the Soviets and East Germans ap-
peared to be maneuvering to soften West German reaction to any eventual
Soviet-bloc military intervention in Poland. At the same time they
were trying to undermine in advance the Reagan administration's drive
to beef up NATO defenses in Europe. In this context could be seen:
East German Communist leader Erich Honecker^s revival of the idea of
35
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German reunification— something that has not been aired publicly at
the official level in East Germany since the 1960s; and Soviet en-
couragement of propaganda campaigns in West Germany against the intro-
duction of nuclear armed cruise missiles into the NATO arsenal on
German soil; against nuclear installations generally in West Germany;
and against the probability that the U.S. might push for NATO forces
36
armed with neutron bombs. These themes were intended to pluck that
cord in West German hearts that remains responsive to any hope to
eventual unification of the divided German homeland.
However, when the East German leadership uses the unification idea,
it may also be hoping to give the East German people something to talk
and think about other than the example being set by the workers next
door across the Oder in Poland.
More recently, and in response to the prolonged Polish crisis,
East and West Germany appear to be mutually shielding their special
relationship from the cold East-West winds of the past 16 months. The
two German states are not taking any steps forward, but neither are
they retreating from the pragmatic cooperation they established at the
height of the 1970s OSTPOLITIK.
This is clear after the exchange of public messages on the subject
in Chancellor Schmidt's parliamentary message on April 9th of this
year and Socialist Unity (.SED-Communist) Party chief Erich Honecker's
37
keynote speech at the East Berlin party congress April 11th.
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Arguments remain between Bonn and East Berlin— on citizenship, the
concept of a unified German nation, the flow of visits between West
and East Germans, and other issues, But both sides are simply stating
38
their differences, then proceeding with business as usual.
Thus, Mr. Schmidt criticized East Germany's quadrupling last fall
of the border-crossing fee for West German visitors to East Berlin,
Since the imposition of the new fee, 25 Deutschemarks (about $12.50),
the number of private West German visitors to the East has fallen by
almost half. Schmidt also condemned the automatic weapons firing at
39
any East Germans who attempt to escape to the West.
But the Chancellor went on to point out that even in the present
tense world situation, West Berlin's lifelines to West Germany have
not been tampered with. And he specified that West Germany, which so
highly values the East-West German contacts of the past decade, would
not retaliate for East German shrinkage of these contacts.
On the East German side, in the same vein, the party newspaper
Neues Deutschland sharply rejected Schmidt's reproaches. But this
relieved Honecker himself from attacking Schmidt at the much more im-
40
portant forum of the party congress.
In his speech, Honecker dismissed "the arrogant claim of the FRG
to speak for all Germans." But he did not dwell on the subject, even
though he had portrayed it half a year ago as a major stumbling block
41











Mr. Honecker further gave the unusual assurance -- "to avoid any
misunderstanding" -- that East Germany is not manipulating its policy
to try to "loosen the Federal Republic's (West Germany's) relations to
42
its alliance partners, especially the U.S."
The East German party and government leader gave West Germany an
even more concrete reassurance in his prepared text, but omitted this
section when he spoke. He said East Germany supports a "quiet and
normal" life for West Berlin on the basis of the 1971, Four-Power
Agreement that normalized West Berlin's status. He added that in line
with "common sense" East Germany remains "ready to deal with the West
Berlin Senate about issues of common interest." Observers took the
deletion of the West Berlin section from the delivered address as a
way of conveying the message to West Germany without sounding too chummy
at the ideologically important party congress.
The current East-West German stabilization follows the period last
fall when Honecker suddently worsened relations, in response to the
Polish crisis. Besides raising border-crossing fees, Honecker launched
a sharp attack last fall on West Germany's policy of granting citizen-
ship automatically to any ethnic German who wanted it, including East
Germans
.
At the time West Germany, in effect, turned the other cheek--and
was therefore accused by some critics of being soft on detente and
yielding to Soviet and East German pressures. The East German pique
blew over, however, and the East German reception of West Germany's




In retrospect, West German analysts believe that Honecker misjudged
the situation last fall and expected overall East-West relations to
deteriorate even more than they have over Poland. When he discovered
that East Germany was alone in its embattled mood, he reverted to a
43
more businesslike tone.
Given the continuing Polish uncertainty, the two German states are
hardly in a position to expand their contacts. At present there could
be no new deals on the unusual pattern of West German money for East
German economic projects, in return for East-West human contacts.
Nor could the twice-postponed Schmidt-Honecker summit be rescheduled,
44
despite East Germany's eagerness to have this stamp of respectability.
Nor are there any hints that East Germany might revoke the expensive
border-crossing charge.
Yet the two German states have agreed not to let their differences
or the Polish suspense degrade the bilateral relations that have be-
come normal over the past decade of 0STP01ITIK, Trade expanded 19
percent last year after stagnating the year before--and as Schmidt
45
has stressed, West Berlin's lifelines remain intact.
And one of the many reasons for Russia's (relative) restraint in
Poland thus far, may be the Kremlin's certain knowledge that, if
Russian soldiers invade, the Hamburg natural gas pipeline deal would
4?
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be off. For one of the paradoxes for the Russian leadership is that
Soviet independence in energy supplies can be achieved only with the
46
help of the West, Germany in particular.
H. CONCLUSION
For the last two decades West Germany has been a stable force on
the continent, and even now, Helmut Schmidt's government is the only
one which continues to be reasonably effective and popular. Germany
continues to prosper economically, albeit she has fallen off slightly
in recent years.
Yet with all this, there have been disquieting signs out of
Germany. Some of the elder statesmen of the Social Democratic party,
notably Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner and Egon Bahr, while reaffirming
their loyalty to the Western alliance, have veered toward some form
of neutralism. The Young Socialists, the Jusos, who constitute per-
haps up to a third of party activists have gone even further. They
"supported" the Soviet invasion of Afganistan with greater enthusiasm
than did some West European Communist parties—which, however cautiously,
dissociated themselves from the Soviet action. Even Willy Brandt re-
marked that the invasion of Afganistan proved that we needed more
47
detente, not less.
It has been fascinating to watch the change in the outlook of
Wehner, Brandt, and their collegues, precisely because, unlike some
"Russia Can Get By With a Little Help From Its Enemies," The
Economist , May 9, 1981
Class Lecture Notes, NATO-West Germany, Professor David Yost,
Naval Postgraduate School, May, 1981.
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Western liberals, they have few illusions about Communism and the
Soviet Union. (Wehner was a leading Communist up to the early 1940s,
while Brandt was in the forefront of the battle against the Communists
as the mayor of West Berlin.) Could the rapprochement they now advocate
be connected with the hope of achieving an all-German confederation?
Perhaps, to some extent. But far more important seems to be the impact
on these men of the change in the balance of power in Europe. The
Soviet Union, as they see it, has become the leading force in Europe,
and West Germany has to accept the fact, Under no circumstances must
it be forced into a conflict with its powerful neighbor. If Germany
remains reasonably strong and prosperous, they believe, it will have
little to fear from Moscow.
It could be said in defense of such ideas that the overall per-
spective from Hamburg—a distance of 30 miles from the Soviet forward
units—let alone from Berlin, is not the same as from Washington.
As Brandt and Wehner see it, Germans will always have to be more
accommodating toward the Soviet Union in view of their geographical
proximity, their traditional trade relations, and of course, their
relationship with East Germany.
The exi stance of the inter-German border, now reinforced by East
German watchtowers, walls and mine fields, has never fully eclipsed
the long term goal of a single Germany. Chancellor Schmidt said
recently:
"Vie Germans cannot, nor do we want to, disown the historical
identity of our people and our nation."
During the cold war, with the Berlin Wall going up and armor
bristling, there was never much chance of the two Germanies becoming
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one. The chances improved when the U.S. embarked on detente, a course
that led West Germany to form its OSTPOLITIK.
For West Germany, detente brought the repatriation of thousands
of ethnic Germans from the Eastern bloc, closer ties between members *
of families separated by the East and West German border and the
removal of Berlin from the world's front pages as the cold war's
tinderbox. The slow and painful gains cannot be forgotten by the
Germans— OSTPOLITIK and the quest for reunification will go on.
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IV. GERMAN REUNIFICATION FROM THE VANTAGE POINT
OF HER EAST EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS
"The Division of Germany must be seen in its proper context
of a divided Europe. We must bring home to our Western partners
the fact that the continued separate existance of seventeen
million of our countrymen under Communist rule is a fate they
share with the other Eastern European countries.""'
"It would be a grave mistake for anyone to regard Europe as
the petrified excresence of two spheres of power: it is a
living community of peoples and states. And the transformation
that some wish for and others would like to stop is already
making itself manifest. "2
There are a number of cogent reasons for taking a closer look at
the impact of the German problem on the East European Alliance: it is
an issue which involves the whole of the alliance on a collective
level; in addition, it is an issue of profound and vital national
strategic importance to several states - specifically East Germany
itself, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union - and as such offers
insights into the pattern of relations within this strategically im-
portant northern tier of states. Furthermore, it is an issue where
the people of East Germany could be expected to oppose the Soviet
Union and perhaps the rest of the alliance. It is dangerous to under-
estimate Germany's desire to become a united nation once again. The
greater the obstacles placed in the way of German reunification the
greater will be the risk of dangerous complications. It is doubtful
Josef Strauss Franz, The Grand Design
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89

whether Soviet leaders can continue to prevent another revolutionary
explosion in this region if they insist on holding East Germany in
subjection -- it is getting too big for them, as its economic progres-
sion would indicate. Furthermore, economic difficulties caused by
East Germany's relations with Moscow, could trigger off a powerful
wave of German nationalism. As long as Germany is divided there is
an increasing danger of a revolution in East Germany, or of West
Germany leaving the Atlantic Alliance in the hope of achieving re-
unification through direct negotiations with the Communists.
The situation in the Soviet dominated nations in Eastern Europe
will improve or deteriorate according to the conditions in which
German reunification is achieved. And conversely, the position of
Germany will be stronger or weaker according to whether the countries
of Eastern Europe become free or remain under total Soviet domination
The current unrest in Poland could be a harbinger of things to come
in East Central Europe.
A. GERMANY IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES
"A reunited Germany has a critical magnitude. She is too
big to play no part in the balance of forces, and too small
herself to hold these forces in balance around her. For this
reason it is, indeed, difficult to imagine that the whole of
Germany, given a continuation of the present political structure
of Europe, could just go and associate herself with one side
or the other. It is for precisely this reason that the growing
together of the two separated parts of Germany can be seen
only as part and parcel of the process of overcoming East-
West conflict in Europe."3
Quote from Kurt Kiesinger, Chancellor of the FRG from 1966-1969;
cited in Helmet Schmidt, The Balance of Power, (London: William Kimber
and Co., 1969), p. 117.
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If a solution to the German problem is to come within the range of
the possible, then it must be one that does not jeopardize the balance
of forces. There is no country in Europe, including the Soviet Union,
that would ever allow Germany the weight necessary for this purpose.
It is, in fact, precisely their anxiety lest Germany acquire greater
weight that has induced not only the Soviet Union but all of Germany's
neighbors to go a long way toward acquiesing in the status quo in
Europe.
In this chapter, I will examine the important Eastern European
countries as examples and sketch their interests, motivations, and
attitudes, past and present, to the German question and the prospect
for a resolution of the German problem.
B„ COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE
To understand the resurgence of the German problem, it is necessary
to examine the evolving state of communism in Eastern Europe.
All the Communist states of Eastern Europe underwent during the
fifties a common phase of liberalization which set in after the death
of Stalin. This assumed different proportions in different countries
and became associated in varying degrees with the endeavor to secure
more autonomy, and with greater stress on national interest in foreign
affairs. The concept 'liberalization' is rather a misnomer that does
justice neither to its substance nor its motives. At the outside it
is applicable to what went on in Czechoslovakia during the first seven
months of 1968. One can see why hard line Communists in Eastern Europe
and the Soviets regard this process as intolerable and why it led to
the catastrophe of intervention.
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Nevertheless, for more than a decade there was a uniform tendency
toward a radical falling off in political and juridicial terror, and
a similar tendency toward greater elasticity in the structures of
economic command in the centralized economics of the East. The causes
of this development were threefold. The Stalinist terror called for
bloody sacrifices not only in the Soviet Union but in all countries.
Opposite tendencies became apparent in the Soviet Union as long ago as
the brief Malenkov period, and, swelling to a climax under Khrushchev
4
and, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, spread to other countries.
The second cause lies in what was found to be the unsatisfactory
economic results produced by the excessively rigid command economics,
motivated as they were by political and ideological considerations and
administered as they were by political fiat. The proud words about
catching up and overtaking the West had been taken to absurd lengths
and were completely unrealistic. The need arose to find economic
methods of greater effectiveness, and the search inevitably led to
greater freedom of decision on the part of bodies away from the center,
5
and to greater delegation of responsibility.
The third cause was also economic in character. The extensive
exploitation of the Eastern European economies for the purpose of maxi-
mizing Soviet economic performance inevitably provoked the other
governments to divergent economic strategies; they turned toward
Harry Schwartz, Eastern Europe in the Soviet Shadow , (New York





other external trading partners and this influenced their foreign
policy. To the same extent, moreover, as the feeling of world political
detente gathered momentum in the mid-Sixties, and as the Sino-Soviet
dispute revealed even to Communists the hollowness of the phrase
'monolithic bloc' — so the foreign policies of the Eastern European
countries proceeded down the road toward relaxation. At the same time
nearly all the governments and Communist Parties attempted, in the
careful accentuation of their foreign policy, to support themselves on
the internal consensus of the masses they ruled. And where individual
accents were scarcely possible owing to the presence of Soviet troops
(e.g., in Hungary after 1956) the regime attempted, through cautious
domestic relaxation, to find a stronger base for themselves in the
consent of their subjects. Only the government of the GDR found itself
in the difficult position of not being able to follow either path. It
was therefore compelled to bring about, on a quite extraordinary scale,
a steady and visible rise in the standard of living and, to this end,
in economic productive capacity. For all of this it is possible to
make certain limited deductions about the foreign political interests
of the various nations. They suggest that different attitudes exist to
the problems of Central Europe and of Germany.
C. PUGNACIOUS POLAND AND THE GERMAN QUESTION
The history of Poland during the last two centuries is practically
synonymous with the history of the partition of the country; i.e., with
6
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the constant struggle between the Germans and the Russians. The
Soviet campaign into Poland now lies sixty years backward in time,
and the simultaneous invasion of Hitler and Stalin, forty years.
Poland's political dependence on France and Britain helped her neither
in 1939 nor later. The Soviet advance up to the Elbe, and the west-
ward displacement of the Polish-Soviet and Polish-German borders
brought about by Soviet power, combined with the fact that Poland is
bracketed by two mass Soviet armies, produced a situation where every
Polish government since 1945 has been compelled to submit to the will
o
of the Soviet master. However, the Polish peoples' widespread lack
of enthusiasm for communism and inability to apotheosize the Communist
leaders on cue has lead to the general malaise and recalcitrance of
the Polish people.
Certain elements of sympathy were present for the Federal Republic,
particularly at the time of the Polish October in 1956: but the in-
9
troduction of the Hallstein Doctrine and its application against the
states of Eastern Europe led to their being wery rapidly supressed.
Poland's natural history gave them little enough reason for valuing
the good neighbor! iness of either the Germans or the Russians; and
their attitude remained basically unchanged up until the 1970 's.
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The Hallstein Doctrine was the brainchild of Chancellor Adenauer's
State Secretary, Walter Hallstein. The Doctrine was the touchstone of
the Federal Republic's foreign policy for a decade following its enucia-
tion in 1955. It codified the FRG's isolation; it stated the intent of
the FRG to eschew diplomatic relations with any country recognizing the
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Ulbricht's Communism, tinged as it was with Prussian bureaucracy, was
included in the Polish lack of love for the Germans. Nevertheless, at
times, the Gomulka regime saw itself compelled by the direction of its
real interests to cooperate with East Berlin in foreign affairs.
Polish governments supported the division of Germany just as they
cling to their alliance with Moscow. Poland was a status quo power,
because any change and any conflict could jeopardize the territorial
arrangements at that time. The FRG did not recognize the division of
Germany or the Oder-Neisse line. The unloved GDR therefore appeared
in the guise of a desirable buffer state and bastion. For the Communist
ruling elite the maintenance of the internal power structure of the
GDR would be endangered, and because sympathy with any changes in the
GDR could undermine the stability of the Polish Communist regime. At
that time, the prospects of a German reunion to form a German unitary
Communist state aroused the profoundest misgivings.
But the German Question raised for all Poles, whether Communists
or not, the issue of Polish security. The Poles were satisfied with
their country territorially; ethnic and political frontiers very largely
coincided — certainly more than at any time in their recent history.
GDR. An exception was made for the Soviet Union, officially because
it was one of the victor occupying powers with whom an all -German peace
treaty must eventually be negotiated.
Chancellor Brandt ultimately signed a treaty with Poland in 1970,
confirming the Oder-Niesse river line as the boundary between the
Democratic Republic and Poland.
N. Edwina Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The































However, much has changed in the last decade. The guarantee of their
Western regions — the Oder Neisse boundary — was a crucial feature of
Poland's external relations with the Federal Republic of West Germany.
Relations with West Germany warmed up considerably during this time --
OSTPOLITIK was in full bloom and the Poles were trading extensively
12
with West Germany.
Coincident with those changes came a change in sentiment for German
reunification. If a reunification for Germany were to be in the cards,
what Poland would like best of all would be a neutralized Germany — a
Germany that, in the Polish view, would have to be cemented into a
European Security System.
In turn, German reunification could be linked with new security
arrangements reducing tensions in Europe and Poland, in particular.
The recent turmoil in Poland may ultimately be the genesis of the un-
raveling of the Communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and
other East European states. The Soviets, weighing the costs of periodic
crisis and repression might inch their way toward relations with
Eastern Europe that don't insist on control of internal affairs of
those countries, but rather, provide mutual security. Closer economic
ties with the FRG and the West in general, and participation in the
world economy, beneficial for the USSR, Poland, the GDR and the rest
of Eastern Europe, could be linked to these new security arrangements





D. THE ENEMY BROTHER
"...There are fears that the Federal Republic might one day —
under radical political leadership -- turn unilaterally to the
East out of disillusion with the continuing failure to achieve
reunification of the German nation. It is, indeed, realized that
such a turn of events would not lead to reunification in freedom,
but only to the loss of Europe's equilibrium."'^
The ninth largest industrial state of the world and the USSR's
largest, and for high technology, its most important foreign trade
partner, East Germany, is Moscow's guarantee of maintaining its greatest
gain from World War II: the partition of Germany and the Soviet domina-
14
tion of the Eastern part.
East Germany enthusiastically pushed for and participated in the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak developments en-
15
dangered Ulbricht's and Moscow's role in East Germany, for the Soviet
Union the most important and for the West the least understood state
in Communist Eastern Europe. The Polish unrest again threatens East
Germany and the USSR, but East Germany and Russia cannot digest or
swallow such a nation as Poland.
Yet East Germany is potentially the most unstable of the Communist
East European states, for one overwhelming reason. It is not a nation,
but a smaller, weaker part of Germany, and since nationalism and
13
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economics favor West Germany, its (GDR) population will at best
resignedly tolerate East Germany's Soviet sponsored rulers. Ulbricht
and Honecker are hardly loveable, charismatic men 3
Ulbricht moved ruthlessly but flexibly, with Soviet support, toward
consultative authoritarianism in economics while retaining coercive
1 g
authoritarianism in the cultural and political spheres. Ulbricht's,
and later Honecker' s importance to the Soviets has increased as the
East German economy has become more important to them, as East-West
detente and West German OSTPOLITIK have opened up the German question,
and as Moscow has had to deal with the contumely behavior of other East
European states. In short, although the East German leaders are un-
popular, they are probably the greatest of any of the Soviet Union's
allies.
The 1961 Berlin Wall and the New Economic System, which the Wall
made possible, were great turning points in East German affairs. Before
the wall, Ulbricht's state was being so rapidly drained of skilled
labor that its economy was nearing collapse. Thereafter, resignation
set in, thus lowering popular pressures against Ulbricht and the Russians
Ulbricht thereafter felt freer to adopt a drastic bureaucratic economic
reform, the New Economic System: extensive decentralization of the
economy, replacement of political cadres by technically trained managers,
significant satisfaction of consumer needs, and, of the greatest
political significance, considerable institutionalization of economic
Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia , 1968,
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979) pp a 114-115.
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and technological interest group representation. Thus functional
conflicts are no longer suppressed but channeled and profited from by
the system -- all the while the commanding height of power — the SED
Presiduim — remains in the hands of the primarily political, still
semi-conspiratorical , "marginal" elite of Ulbricht and his collegues
and successors. However, East German reforms remain essentially
bureaucratic. They do not, as in Yugoslavia, involve the introduction
of a market economy or enterprise autonomy in foreign trade.
Thus, a new technological "counter-elite" has come into power in
East Germany at most levels below the Presidium. This seems unlikely
to challenge the control of Ulbricht ' s 71 year old successor, Erich
Honecker. Only decisive change in Soviet policy toward Germany, East
and West, or Poland, would make such a challenge likely: and the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia made this seem farther away than ever.
But Honecker's rationalized rule still remains potentially unstable,
especially with the German question beginning to unfreeze. The West
German OSTPOLITIK and the Czechoslovak liberalization initially un thawed
18
the question. For Ulbricht and the Russians, therefore, the invasion
of Czechoslovakia was inter alia intended to reinsure East Germany's
stability and block West Germany's influence. However, the effect was
not permanent, but rather a temporary stop gap measure.
Although East - West detente and the Berlin Wall produced a more







Question. Moscow resumed an active, offensive European policy; East
Germany acted on West German public opinion, frustrated by the Wall's
blocking on internal German travel and its blow to the dream of re-
unification; and West Germany's resultant new OSTPOLITIK did the same
19
in Eastern Europe, including East Germany. Bonn did well in South-
eastern Europe, would have done well in Czechoslovakia had not the
Soviets invaded, and was beginning to bring about the isolation of
East Germany.
Thus Honecker's rationalized rule still remains potentially unstable
in spite of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Afganistan, and its
scare tactics in Poland. The liberalization of Poland threatens again
to raise the chants for reunification. Whatever the Soviets do in the
Poland case, they cannot refreeze the German question, they can only
postpone it or exacerbate the demands for it.
E. CZECHOSLOVAKIA (BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER AUGUST, 1968) AND THE
GERMAN QUESTION
The Czechoslovak cultural and political traditions make them a
Western people. They have always had neighbors more powerful and
arrogant than themselves and have therefore learnt how to stay the
20
course to adjust themselves to any situation that arises. The
19
Willy Brandt travelled to Erfurt in East Germany on March 19th
1970, and the East German Prime Minister, Willi Stoph, paid a return
visit to Kassel in West Germany on 21 May 1970. The enthusiastic
demonstrations in Erfurt (crowds of East Germans shouted Brandt's
name for several minutes) were a personal triumph for Willy Brandt.
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breakneck pace at which the demand for individual freedom mounted during
the spring of 1968 (while Soviet warnings were underestimated or ignored);
the strength of Czech passive resistance during August and September of
that year that earned the sympathy of the world; the headstrong delight
in taking risks which was apparent in these events -- all these things
21
surprised everybody.
After 1948, the Czechs — enraged and disillusioned by the Western
power's abandonment of the country of Masaryk and Benes, and filled
with hatred of the Germans -- had inwardly gone a long way toward coming
to terms with the Soviet seizure of power and Soviet domination, par-
ticularly as the latter seemed to guarantee the external security that
had merely been promised by the West but not carried out. That this
nevertheless gave way in 1967/68 to an internal structural change (as
it was at first) which was to lead to disastrous foreign political con-
sequences for Czechoslovakia, had several reasons. First of all, there
was the morally highly dubious and economically incompetent Novotny
regime,, Not until 1963 did Novotny, yielding to growing internal pres-
sure, resistantly begin the process of de-Stalinization and rehabilita-
tion of those tortured and imprisoned during the terror trials of the
early Fifties. The development, furthermore, of what was basically a
highly developed industrial economy, had been hopelessly slowed down
by the imposition of an ineffective system of economic direction.
Novotny 's people did not dare put into operation the proposals for
economic reform that had been laid before them, because they feared
21




(with every justification) that these might have unfavorable repercus-
sions for their personal power position. All this led, from 1965 onwards,
to rapidly developing opposition on the part of the relatively extensive
Czech intelligentsia and educated class -- and this included the Com-
22
munists who were in the van of the reform movement „ This situation
has shades of similarity to the present East German situation.
External impetus came at last from the Slovaks who had too often
and for too long been treated as second class citizens by Prague --
especially under Novotny. Dubcek rose in 1963 to the top of the Slovak
Communist Party which had been run on Stalinist lines up till then.
His arguments with Novotny led to connections with the Prague reformers.
The Novotny regime reacted uncertainly and crumbled in the face of a
swing of opinion with the Central Committee on the Communist Party
which, for the first time (and, as regards Europe as a whole, the only
time) felt that it had the support of a great majority of the country's
23
population (i.e., of the Czechs, the Slovaks and the minorities).
So rapid and extensive a process of democratisation would presumably
not have taken place in Czechoslovakia if its peoples had actually
entertained any actual fears of danger from withouto But the Czechs
had for a long time ceased to believe Novotny when he attempted to
arouse in them fears of the Federal Republic based on manifestly im-
probable exaggerations; the Slovaks, in any case, had never been
22
Adam 111am, Expansion and Coexistance, (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1974) pp. 738-739.
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particularly anti-German. In 1965 and 1966, the Federal Republic was
the country on which most economic hopes were set, and toward which
much thought was directed. The GDR on the other hand, was unpopular,
even with Novotny — a consequence of Ulbricht's striking gift for
arrogance and perfidy. Even in 1966, a number of leading figures in
the Novotny regime came out for a normalization of relations and for
a resumption of diplomatic contacts with Bonn. After 1966, and the
inauguration of the 'New Ostpolitik 1 hopes were directed even more
openly toward future economic exchanges with the Federal Republic and
towards economic credits from the latter.
The Soviet leadership was well aware that the domestic events in
Czechoslovakia were not influenced by Bonn. But they had to take into
account, with the rise of Czech hopes of economic aid from Western
Germany, a possible reduction in their own influence. This might have
been acceptable to Moscow if the process of liberalization and demo-
cratization in Czechoslovakia had not gone to such lengths that not
only was the monopoly rule of the Communist Party of the Czech Soviet
Socialist Republic threatened, but there was a danger that the bacillus
of freedom of opinion might spead to the GDR and Poland (perhaps even
. 24
to the Ukraine) and undermine the Communist regimes there. The in-
vasion, which had long been planned and was brilliantly prepared
militarily, met with spiritual resistance within Czechoslovakia of a
degree of solidarity completely unsuspected by the Soviets: and it
24
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was six months before people known to the public were prepared to
25
collaborate with the occupation forces.
It was a foregone conclusion that Moscow would blame Bonn for the
debacle, particularly as Blessing, the President of the Federal Central
Bank at that time, and Scheel , the leader of the FDP opposition, had
paid visits to Prague early in 1968 (despite urgent representations to
the contrary from people better informed) and had therefore provided
the Soviets with a peg on which to hang their anti -German imputations.
In fact, the invitations which gave rise to these visits were just
another symptom of the inability of the Prague Communists to make a
correct assessment of the extent to which Moscow might feel its vital
interests to be at risk, and therefore the danger of Soviet intervention.
After March 1968, the FRG rated higher than Prague the chances of a
Soviet intervention, and in this Prague was evidently misled by the




It is difficult to predict how Czechoslovakia's policy toward Germany,
and the German Question in particular, will be in the future. Initially
it will be a function of its dependence on the Soviet Union. Its later
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whether the Soviet Union will relax its holds on Eastern Europe or
tighten the clamps. Prague will remain vitally interested in economic
links with the Federal Republic: it was, after all, Novotny and not
28
Dubcek who first exchanged economic representations with Bonn, The
still continuing and artificially stimulated discussion about the
Munich Agreement of 1938, that in the end gave Hitler a free hand for
the rape of Czechoslovakia, will not place any serious obstacle in the
way of establishing closer exchanges with Bonn.
Similarly, no obstacle will arise over an alleged German territorial
claim. The declarations of the Federal Republic to this end doubtless
carry conviction in Prague -- despite the suspicions sown by Ulbricht
and Honecker's people to the contrary. In the foreseeable future,
Prague will have no security requirement vis a vis the Federal Republic.
Should some regime in Prague think it necessary to inculcate fear of
the Germans at some time in the future in order to gain internal support
for itself, it will have great difficulty in reviving fears of German
'revanchism'
.
However, the fact that both objective and subjective bases exist
for normal and friendly relations with Czechoslovakia does not mean
that Czechoslovakia will take up a positive attitude toward a reunifica-
tion of Germany. Admittedly, any government in Prague that makes a
true estimate of the power factors affecting its country would regard
joint condemnations of the Federal Republic by the Warsaw Pact as lip





threat, unless it were done in a broader European context. The same
reasons apply here as in the case of the Soviet Union; but in that of
Prague, the additional geographical factors cannot be overlooked. At
best, Prague might fall back on the formula that Germany is a problem
for the Germans. However, the Czechs will be interested in greater
East European freedoms, mutual arms limitations, and economic decen-
tralization. They would be amenable to the withdrawal of foreign
troops from central and Western Europe. If reunification of Germany
would lead to the sloughing off of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe,
the Czechs might view it as a very inviting proposal,
F, YUGOSLAVIA — THE SENTIMENTS OF THE COMMUNIST MAVERICK
If Bulgaria, among the non-German national states of Eastern
Europe, is the one most disposed to lean on Moscow, then Yugoslavia
is the communist national state furthest removed from this attitude.
Yugoslavia did not require the direct help of Soviet armies in freeing
itself from Nazi occupation; and from the military geographical view-
point it was out of reach of direct Soviet intervention. Both facts
helped Tito's break with Stalin, now twenty years old. The largely
pre-indus trial structure of the country, which is most marked in the
Southern and Eastern republics, favored the spread of Tito's ideolo-
29
gically and practically ideosyncratic form of Communism.
In both its internal and external characteristics, Belgrade's
policy is the result of a highly successful balance achieved by this
Gripp, pp. 25-26, 32.
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outstanding ruler of the Yugoslav communistSo The varied and contrast-
ing characteristics of the peoples of Yugoslavia (Serbs, the more
Western oriented Croats and Slovenes, Macedonians, Bosnians, Montenegrans
and Albanians) made a federal, and therefore a more democratic, structure
inevitable; and this is the hallmark of Yugoslav Communism. And the
rivalries between the nationalities have an effect deep inside the
1 e . . 30league of communists.
The policy of remaining outside all alliances has pretty well taken
root in the country's consciousness, despite traditional Serbian leanings
toward Russia. The economic blockade enforced against Yugoslavia twenty
years ago by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states, made as big a
contribution to this as Tito's authority — and not least of all his
dignified bearing toward Khrushchev. The foreign political aloofness
toward Moscow changed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (when
the Yugoslavs expressed open sympathy for Dubcek) into pronounced fear
31
lest the same ill befall Yugoslavia, They came out clearly and
sharply against the Brezhnev Doctrine. More recently the Yugoslavs
have shown revulsion against the Soviets intrusions in Afganistan and
Ethiopia. They had made pronouncements and exhortations against
similar movements in the Polish crisis.
Tito's immediate succession gave rise to a period of difficulty,







affairs. The changeover led to no internal and foreign political
changes. Because a state of fairly continuous economic and domestic
political development was achieved, neither the reluctance to enter
32
blocs or the attitude toward East Berlin altered. Belgrade has not
allowed itself to be harnessed to Honecker's wagon; its political re-
lations with the GDR, as well as with the Federal Republic, are correct,
Economic relations with the Federal Republic, on the other hand, are
33
of great importance. The extraordinary large numbers of Yugoslav
workers who go to the Federal Republic (balanced by an equally copious
flow of German tourists to Yugoslavia) have been an additional cause
of quite sympathic feelings toward the Federal Republic on the part of
the younger generation of Yugoslavs. This will probably be further
ameliorated when the Winter Olympics hit Sarajevo in 1984. The resump-
34
tion of diplomatic relations by the Grand Coalition in Bonn, and
Willy Brandt's visit to Belgrade, followed by Schmidt's visit at Tito's
death, confirmed in the minds of both, the factual assessments each
had made of the other during the interim. In the future, we should be
able to expect -- assuming continued internal stability in Belgrade --
that Communist Yugoslavia will be more inclined to favor the Federal






The 'Grand Coalition' was the government of Chancellor Kurt
Kiesinger and Vice Chancellor Willy Brandt; it was so named because
it was composed of the two major parties, the CDU and SPD.
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But this does not mean to say that Belgrade would adopt a positive
attitude toward German reunification. Nevertheless, Belgrade would
probably have no misgivings provided the European balance -- and with
it the neutrality of Yugoslavia -- would not be imperiled. Belgrade
does not believe in the dissolution of the two alliance system, and
does not desire this. It would rather put its trust in a process of
gradual evolution which could lead to both systems being overarched
by a treaty. "Borta" the Belgrade official party organ, wrote shortly
after the invasion of Czechoslovakia:
"Socialism is the inescapable future of all nations and
countries but they will only achieve it by their own path and
by their own means. For this reason no one -- no country,
nation, working class or group — can monopolize or appropriate
it. It follows that humanity can accept no one in the role of
supreme judge -- a pontifex maximus of socialism who hands down
infallible judgments about who is a socialist and who is not,
about what the true foundations of Marxism-Leninism rest upon,
what is the spirit of internationalism and the class struggle,
and what is 'revisionism' or even 'counter revolution' in a
socialist country. "35
This statement certainly portends a heavy meaning for the current
situation in the eastern bloc. The Yugoslav foreign ministry
specifically warned Moscow on December 5th not to invade Poland. If
the Soviet Union wishes to attract Belgrade back into its orbit, or
even Finlandize it, what she would need is the opposite of the Brezhnev
Doctrine. As long as she goes on trying to find ideological trappings
for her claim to hegemony, however, there will be no warm-hearted
response from Belgrade -- assuming, that is, that Yugoslavia continues






Communism was imposed on Rumania at the end of the second World War;
but the Rumanians are not a Slav people. Under Ceausescu's leadership,
Bucharest, despite its close goegraphical proximity to the Soviet Union,
is trying to uphold the independence of its foreign policy in every
available forum — whether in the Warsaw Pact or CMEA, or the United
Nations in New York, Rumania did not join in the condemnations of
either MAO or Dubcek, and Ceausescu sympathized openly with the Prague
Spring. Rumania does not want the Soviet Union to resort to military
intervention to resolve its Polish dilemma or any other East European
problem.
Domestically, however, Bucharest has displayed some nervousness
about the possible impact of the Polish example of Rumanian workers.
Notably, schizophrenic Rumania took part in the Warsaw Pact summit in
Moscow at the beginning of December — a participation it denied the
Soviet Union at a simple gathering prior to the invasion of Czechoslova-
kia in 1968.
However, Ceausescu has preserved a high degree of autonomy in his
country's external relations and constantly lays stress on its national
interests. It is probable that Ceausescu is supported by a wide
measure of agreement among his people.
Rumania's national strategy carried with it, however, a considerable





Czech invasion led, in the summer of 1968, to a tense situation in the
course of which the leadership of the Rumanian Communist Party publicly
37
ordered preparations for the military defense of the country. Even
though the will to fight and the combat readiness of the Rumanian armed
forces in such a conflict would be difficult to predict with exactitude,
it is nevertheless of unprecedented significance that during the autumn
of 1968 it became possible for the first time to reckon with the pos-
sibility of war between two European Communist Parties and the USSR.
An event of this sort would certainly shatter the unity among Parties
and lead to a fluid situation in Europe — possibly the restructuring
of the entire Eastern bloc and ultimately the reunification of Germany.
This is possibly the calculation behind Ceausescu's foreign policy which,
while completely correct, peaceful and morally above reproach, is
nevertheless a very risky one.
Against this background, the Federal Republic resumed diplomatic
relations with Rumania in 1967 -- in contravention of the Hallstein
38
Doctrine. As in the case of Yugoslavia, Bonn took care to inform
Moscow of the intended step: no objection was made — and any objection
would have been difficult to substantiate. Nevertheless, Moscow did
39
not view relations between Bucharest and Bonn with any particular joy,
any more than she did the considerable trade between the two countries.
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East Berlin watched both with great distaste, especially when the
irasible Ulbricht was at the helm. However, Rumania's internal policy—
unlike that of Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia— hardly lays her open to
charges of ideological heresy, or arguments involving Communist ideology,
For the Rumanians, who signed both the Bucharest Declaration of the
Warsaw Pact states in 1968, are doing no more than what is demanded by
these resolutions of their allies: they are putting into practice the
principles laid down therein regarding sovereignty, equal rights,
national independence and non-intervention (this latter, incidentally,
a principle that was missing from the Budapest Declaration signed after
Prague!). 40
In these joint resolutions, Rumania agreed with the call for re-
unification of the alleged right of the FRG to represent the German
people, and for recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and the GDR. Since
both these requirements have been fulfilled (the Oder-Neisse line was
recognized in 1971 by the FRG; the German Basic Treaty passed in 1973
by the Bundestag, recognizes two separate states) they are no longer
issues. There is no doubt that Rumania is interested in arms limita-
tions, in the withdrawal of foreign troops (MBFR), and in the dis-
mantling of the bipolar system of blocs and alliances.. Rumania also
had a hand in the proposals for a European Security Conference and
a European security system. Rumania clearly would like to see an
autonomous Europe, purged of a Russian overseer; if this were to
40
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involve the reunification of a neutral Germany I would posit that it
would not be viewed as a threat to the Rumanian people.
H. PROGRESSIVE HUNGARY - EDGING TOWARD AUTONOMY
Since its debacle in 1956, Hungary has achieved considerable civic
freedom compared with the other Communist countries -- the result es-
sentially of official policy in Kadar's regime. Stressing how much
has already been achieved, Hungarian officials quietly assure visitors
they intend to go further, including giving more effective authority
to the official trade unions and more independence to factory managers.
The degree of freedom is far from meeting Western standards, how-
ever. There is still complete press censorship. Hungarian editors
take care to stay within party guidelines. But the citizens are well
informed and habitually listen to Western radio stations.
Art, music and nonpolitical cultural expression are unrestrained,
but restraints are firm on theatres, films and books which touch
political sensitivities.
Ordinary citizens in the country can travel to the West once ewery
two years, more often if relatives or others offer the foreign currency
required. Hungary is a Roman Catholic country and the practice of
religion is unrestricted. But these civic easements are contained
within a system of Communist Party domination of all institutions ex-
41
cept the Church. The Hungarian economy works pretty well and agri-





The Hungarian Communist Party has much at stake in a peaceful
resolution of Poland's labor and economic crisis, Hungary's leaders
have a common interest with Poland and the FRG in continuing reforms
of the Communist system and they are worried about the effects a resort
to force in Poland could have in Hungary,
Hungary is experiencing a quiet liberalization, but it is evident
that the country is voracious for the truer freedoms and independence
from the spector of the Russian genre of Communism that haunts them.
A greater European solution — open liberalization; perhaps, Finlandiza-
tion of Eastern Europe, would clearly satiate Hungary, Within this
context, the reunification of a neutral Germany would not be anathema
to a country yearning for its own expression.
I. ACQUIESCENT BULGARIA
Bulgaria will not command much space here for the reason that it
adheres most extensively to the official line of the Soviet Union in
their policy toward Germany and as regards security in general, It
is almost an alter-ego of Moscow and whatever the Kremlin deems correct,
Bulgaria will follow. If Moscow ultimately promotes the idea of a
neutralized, unified German state, Bulgaria will not be expected to
express reservations.
J. EPILOGUE: THE WARSAW ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN QUESTION
"For us Germans the rigid clinging to the status quo is
particularly difficult because it does not open up any prospect
of overcoming the division of Germany. For Europe as a whole
the present state of division cannot be final either. It is
difficult to harmonize the rigid Soviet position with the
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properly understood interests of Europe, which has a right to
its own, peacefully secured exi stance, as Europeans are becoming
increasingly aware. "42
The Soviet Union's initial use of the Warsaw Pact as a diplomatic
mouthpiece in East-West exchanges on the German question reflects both
the fundamental significance of the issue but also the artificial role
it had come to play in maintaining a pattern of relations which came to
be felt as increasingly anachronistic by a number of the East European
states, except of course East German (and to a certain extent, Poland)
in the period prior to 1969. The extent, therefore, that the more
artificial "cohesive" aspects of the German question have been modified
43 /
in the wake of the agreements of 1970 and 1973, (especially the use
of the West German threat as a weapon of bloc cohesion) this should
contribute to and reinforce the process of change underway from a Soviet-
dominated alliance system toward a more mature political system.
If the German problem for Eastern Europe has not altogether been
resolved, it has nevertheless been more clearly defined. Assuming
that the balance of mutual security is not subjected to radical changes,
there would seem to be at least the possibility of translating the
changed political context — the regulation of the German Problem and
its counterpart, the Helsinki accord on security and cooperation in
Europe — into practical benefits in terms of greater autonomy in the
42
Willy Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe
,
(Canada: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1969), p. 95.
43
Referring to the treaty with Poland where the FRG recognized
Polish frontiers; and the Basic German Treaty, where the FRG acknow-
ledged the exi stance of the GDR.
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conduct of domestic and foreign policy on the part of the individual
Warsaw Pact states.
Soviet policy in Europe has tended to be portrayed as having two
dimensions, the desire for consolidation in the East and the pursuit
of the practical benefits of coexi stance in the West. In the past,
the Soviet leaders, in being confronted with a choice, have invariably
opted for the former, with sometimes disastrous consequences for their
allies.
Leaving aside any more wide-ranging reflections on the future of
the present alliance forms in international politics, the changing role
and nature of the Polish and German problem might be expected to put
relations within the alliance on a more rational basis and thereby
heighten both the basic preceptions of common interests between the
individual states, and their growing awareness of differing national
priorities. These two trends, toward greater relative autonomy and
toward the development of a more stable political alliance, are not,
and should not necessarily be expected to be mutually exclusive.
They may well prove to be mutually dependent. The denouncement
of the German Question may well provide the solution to East European
nationalism and a more viable security system for both East and West.
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V. THE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE OF WEST GERMANY, EAST GERMANY
AND THE SOVIET UNION
In this chapter I intend to examine the economic interdependence
of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the
Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR). In dealing with Russia there
are three reasons why Germany, East and West, tend to behave differently
from the United States and even Europe. One is a down to earth reason
of practical interest; the other lies in the realm of psycho-politics;
and the last relates to the dream for German reunification.
The practical reason that West Germany (FRG) does more trade with
the Soviet Union is economic. The psychological reason -- West Germany
does a special human trade in trying to save fellow Germans from isola-
tion behind the iron curtain. Rattled by recession and the falling
deutschmark, the West German government, when asked by the United States
to reconsider its links with Russia will swallow twice when this means
asking trade unions to lose more jobs and capitalists to forego more
profits as well as seeing East Germany withdraw such few concessions
to humanity as it has made in the past few years. Two major problems
converge on West Germany -- the closest major European country to the
Soviet Army and the one with the most to lose in trade and human
contacts with the Communist world. Hence West Germany's notably




A. PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER TRADE — FRG/GDR/USSR
The prospects of further expanding trade between the FRG, GDR, the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe continue to look favorable, thanks to
the fact that their resources and products complement each other in
many ways. As a result of progressive industrialization and the resump-
tion of agricultural development, the USSR and all of the countries of
Eastern Europe are more dependent today than before the last war on
foreign deliveries of valuable investment goods and industrial equip-
ment. The export structure of Germany in particular is ideally suited
to delivering increasing quantities of such goods. In German exports,
for instance, the chief stress continues to be on investment goods and
2 -
capital goods. Therefore the Federal Republic of Germany has become
the most important Western trade partner of Eastern bloc countries.
For the same reason, the German Democratic Republic is, next to the
Soviet Union, the most important Eastern trade partner of Eastern-bloc
countries. Moreover, intra-German trade has, from 1962 to present,
been responsible for 25%— 34% of all FRG trade with the Warsaw Pact
states (see Table I). East Germany, naturally has a higher level of
Harry Swartz, Eastern Europe in the Soviet Shadow , (New York, The
John Day Co.) 1974, pp. 71-83.
Stanley Radcliffe, 25 Years On The Two Germanies
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INTRA-GERMAN TRADE AS A PROPORTION OF WEST GERMANY'S
TRADE WITH THE WARSAW PACT STATES (INCLUDING ALBANIA)
Year Total trade Intra-German Intra-German trade
turnover trade as a proportion (%)
(in mill ions DM)
1962 5,781.9 1,767.1 30.6
1963 5,650.9 1,881.9 33.3
1964 6,586.2 2,178.4 33.1
1965 7,434.2 2,466.5 33.2
1966 8,529.8 2,970.7 34.8
1967 8,987.0 2,746.9 30.6
1968 9,711.9 2,871.6 29.6
1969 11,885.0 3,928.1 33.1
1970 12,922.9 4,143.7 32.1
1971 14,546.9 4,817.2 33.1
1972 17,359.0 5,308.3 30.6
1973 21.728.3 5,658.0 26.0
1974 29,342.5 6,924.0 23.6
1975 31.335.6 7,264.0 23.2
1976 34,035.6 8,146.0 23.9
Source: Moreton, p. 244
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trade with her Warsaw Pact partners than with West Germany, however
4 /
the 10%— 15% trade ratio is substantive (see Table II).
Since the foreign trade relations of the USSR and all of Eastern
bloc countries still underlie strict planning, bilateral trade agree-
ments prescribing rigidly fixed quotas are practically the only ones
suitable for centralized economic plans in the various Eastern states.
All digressions of foreign trade turnover from planned imports and
foreign exchange experts have a yery disturbing effect on internal
5
economic development in the countries concerned. The communist states
can, however, only negotiate binding quotas for goods to be taken or
delivered with members of their own group or developing countries with
planned economics. This is the main technical and economic reason
why, despite the limited opportunities of mutual complementation,
foreign trade relations between the communist states are so dispropor-
tionate, and why their trade with the developing countries is being
driven so forcefully. Like all developing countries the economics in
Eastern Europe are appealing more intensively for substantial and long
term credits and technical aid from the FRG and the West. The further
their economic development progresses (East Germany is a good example)
the more rational their economic policy becomes.
Although today East-West trade is relatively small in volume and
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INTRA-GERMAN TRADE AS A PROPORTION OF EAST GERMANY'S
TRADE WITH THE WARSAW PACT STATES (INCLUDING ALBANIA)
Year Total trade Intra-German Intra-German trade
turnover trade as a proDortion [%)
(in millions Valuta-Mark)
1962 16,742.5 1,708,3 10.2
1963 17,592 1,849 10.51
1964 19,060.5 2,190,8 11.49
1965 19,446.5 2,341.7 12.04
1966 21,101,9 2,757 13.07
1967 22,104.7 2,537.5 11.48
1968 24,163.9 2,637.2 10.91
1969 27,314.6 3,489.1 12.77
1970 30,639.5 4,050 13.22
1971 36,647.8 4,294.6 13.15
1972 36,230,1 4,827.7 13.33
1973 39,829.6 4,935.2 12.4
1974 44,344 5,997.3 13,5
1975 55,059,2 6,474.6 11.8
1976 61,120.1 7,360 12.0





Once the Eastern economics, which are in a state of impetuous
development, have attained a certain degree of maturity, and provided
they are one day allowed autonomy and liberalization, they can also be-
come valuable trade partners of the Western world and draw benefit
from a Greater European Economic Community.
B. FRG— USSR INTERDEPENDENCE
1 . Background
The Federal Republic of Germany is the principal western trading
partner of the Soviet Union. In the nineteen-seventies, the Federal
Republic's trade with the Soviet Union increased at double the rate of
its trade with the rest of the world. In the first three months of
1980, sales to the Soviet Union increased by twenty-four percent over
the same period a year ago.
There are German political hostages to the Soviet Union: Berlin,
communications between divided families in the two Germanies, the re-
o
patriation of ethnic Germans from other countries of the East. The
FRG has been willing to pay a large price for the increase in human
contacts between the two Germanies. The Soviet Union has gained ad-
vantages from this. The FRG's desire to maintain the position that
East and West Germany constitute one nation has led the FRG to develop
a special relationship with the GDR. By terms of the 1957 Treaty of
Roger Morgan, West Germany's Foreign Policy Agenda , (London: Sage





Rome, which established the European Economic Community, the GDR became
9
a defacto member of the common market.
2. The Pipeline
The Soviet-Western European gas pipeline is a luminous example
of the trade cooperation and interdependence of the Soviet Union and
the Federal Republic of Germany. Even with the implied Soviet threat
to Poland heating up, and with Moscow and Washington engaged in hurling
invectives at one another, West German businessmen are still pressing
ahead with negotiations on what would be the biggest East-West deal
ever: the $10—15 billion Soviet-gas-for-German pipeline exchange that
both sides hope to wrap up soon. The two sides reached preliminary
agreement at the end of January on 10 year credits at the low interest
rate of 7.75 percent. Some West German bankers are suggesting that
because of complex pricing and other conditions this formal rate would
amount to a real interest of 9.75 percent.
What is clear is that for West Germany both the potential
economic gains and the political risks are enormous. The gains would
include a significant move away from dependence on uncertain Mideast
oil and a major contract for the recession-hit German steel industry.
From 1985 on into the 21st century, West Germany would get an addition-
al 12 billion cubic meters of Soviet gas annually.
g
*Ibid.





The political risks in the deal could include a Soviet invasion
of Poland and a retaliatory Western embargo on technology sales to the
Soviet Union.
The FRG is the key country in the equation and currently derives
15 percent of its oil and natural gas (17 percent gas alone) from the
Soviet Union. Under the agreement now being negotiated, by 1990 the
share of Soviet supplies in West Germany's total gas consumption would
12jump to 30 percent or 5 to 6 percent of primary energy.
Despite repeated Soviet failures to deliver contracted gas
during cold spells— this winters' deliveries to West Germany will drop
a third below promised amounts — West German businessmen view Soviet
gas as much more reliable than Mideast oil. And the Bonn government
views the projected ceiling of gas dependence on the Soviet Union as
13
tolerable strategically. The West German steel compressor, and re-
frigeration companies are also eager to get the expected 10 billion
deutschemarks (5 billion dollars) worth of orders from this 3,600 mile
pipeline, the longest in the world. Germans are also eager for those
14
2,500 extra workplaces that the Soviet order would bring. However,
conservative American strategists (as well as some conservative
politicians in West Germany) fear the impact of any Soviet bullying
tactics on Western European policies when the Kremlin could turn off
the spigot on so much Western European energy.
12
The Economist , "Hamburg Pipeline," May 9, 1981, p. 97.
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The dilemma that has divided the U.S. strategic community —
whether it is more "stabilizing" in the world to help or stay aloof
from future development of the Soviet Union's vast energy resources —
hardly exists among West German businessmen. The assumption is that
the more energy sources there are in an energy short world, the better
for everyone.
From this West German perspective, Western help in exploiting
Soviet natural gas reserves -- estimated as the largest in the world --
is seen as a desirable move. And the Soviet trade with the West —
gas is expected to replace oil as the top Soviet hard currency earner
in this decade — still seems more likely to promote Soviet moderniza-
tion than ostracism. Deals such as these may eventually ameliorate the
situation in Eastern Europe — from a scene of Soviet dominance to a
scene of growing East European independence wherein German reunifica-
tion may ultimately be realized.
3. FRG Perspective on Trade With Soviet Union -- Post Afganistan
This case amply demonstrates the importance the West Germans
place on trade with the Soviet Union, despite exhortations and protesta-
tions from the United States, who at the time, had imposed an embargo
of materials and grains to the Soviet Union.
The following case originated from a FBIS article dated 8 May
1980. Horst Schieffman, chairman of the production council of a steel
plant in Muelheim, Germany was interviewed. He announced his enter-
prise's readiness to continue deliveries of pipe to the Soviet Union
in spite of the pressure of the Carter administration, which had
persistantly appealed to its West European partners for an economic
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boycott of the USSR. Horst Schieffman explained his position on trade
with the Soviet Union as follows:
"Because of the lack of new contracts, beginning in October
last year the plant in Muelhiem was forced to put more than half
of its production workers on a short work day. Just at that
moment a large order came in from the Soviet Union, which made
it possible this March to bring the enterprise up to full capacity,
which means that everyone kept his job. Altogether, the orders
from the USSR mean jobs for approximately 8,000 workers and
employees."
"This is why we are categorically opposed to any sort of
economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, which indeed could
be turned against us ourselves a Moreover, we should not
forget the lesson of 1963, when the Adenauer government following
instructions from Washington, ordered an embargo on deliveries
of large diameter pipe to the Soviet Union, The only losers were
the West German firms, factories, and workers. The result of
this is well known: the Soviet Union cut back its trade with
the FRG, intensified its cooperation with other countries, in-
cluding capitalists countries and arranged for large-diameter
pipe to be manufactured at its own production facility."
This illustrative case demonstrates the little enthusiasm that the
West Germans have in abolishing or limiting trade with the Soviet Union.
It appears to be a symbolic relationship that neither side is anxious
to squelch, rather they are enthusiastic in their pursuit of intercountry
trade.
C. GDR/USSR ECONOMIC RELATIONS
The GDR is the strongest member of COMECON except for the Soviets,
and East Germany's power has played an important role in expanding its
political clout, both within the Bloc and with the West. The system
introduced by Ulbricht in the early sixties recognized economic
realities at the expense of Marxist propaganda and exploited the
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Figure 8. Map of FRG's Natural Resources
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not to say the concept of central planning was abandoned, but rather
1 c
modified within the framework of Communist authoritarianism.
The GDR's economy is inextricably enmeshed economically, scienti-
fically, and technically with that of the Soviet Union; for which it
produces machinery, machine tools, precision instruments and electronics,
chemicals and petrochemical products, ships and consumer goods. The
Soviet Union provides the GDR with raw materials, primarily crude oil,
cotton, iron ore, timber, iron, steel, and other metals. To a degree,
the integration of the GDR into COMECON threatens the special relation-
ship with the Soviet Union through pressures for standardization and
removal of special trading rights. The Soviet interests in COMECON
integration probably transcends the parochial concerns of the GDR,
the partner that stands to lose more in any surrender of economic
autonomy. In fact the situation was made more complex with the energy
crisis and worldwide recession which impaired the GDR's economic
advantages in trade with the USSR.
So, in spite of the fact that East Germany is a more developed
country than is the Soviet Union, Soviet--GDR economic relations (as
well as political and military relations) are characterized by a
fundamental asymetry: the GDR is economically more dependent on the
USSR than vice versa. Foreign trade is much more important for the
15
N. Edinna Moreton, pp. 18-20.
16
Stanley Radcliffe, pp. 144-146.
In the past few years, there have been some signs that the GDR
and the USSR have become more competitive in their trade with the FRG.
In addition, the GDR has on one occasion, vetoed a Soviet-FRG agreement
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GDR economy than for the Soviet economy. Moreover, in the last decade,
as East-West trade has grown, the USSR has been able to diversify its
sources of machinery and advanced technology imports, whereas the GDR
remains almost totally dependent on the USSR for vital raw material
imports. Soviet-GDR trade, like Soviet trade with the FRG and other
western countries, is complementary, involving the exchange of East
German industrial goods, for Soviet raw materials. As raw materials
prices, particularly those for energy, have risen in the last eight
1
8
years, the terms of trade have gone increasingly in the USSR's favor.
The USSR countenances a potential conflict between economic and
political goals in its economic relations with the GDR which may well
loom to the proportions evident in Poland today. While it is in the
Soviets' economic interest to raise the prices for exports to East
Germany, it is in its political interest to intensify its economic
integration with the GDR, to maintain a constant source of dominance
and influence. While on purely economic grounds it may be advisable
for the Soviet Union to lessen the intensity of its trade with the GDR,
political considerations suggest the advisability of maintaining close
economic relations with East Germany. Moreover, the greater the econo-
mic dependence of the GDR on the Soviet Union, the higher the price of
reorientating the GDR's political loyalties. However, this premise
has not proven true in Poland and it probably will not hold true in
the GDR either.
18
Stanley Radcliffe, pp. 144-146.
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As in political and military relations, the USSR's economic relations
with the GDR exist on a number of overlapping levels, each of which re-
inforce the other B Bilateral Soviet--GDR economic relations, embodied
in a series of trade and cooperation agreements, are the cornerstone of
the relationship. They are reinforced by the role of the GDR and the
USSR in CMEA; however, GDR — Soviet economic relations are closer than
those between either the USSR or the GDR with other CMEA states. In
addition, the Soviet and East German economic systems are similar, and
East Germany's economic plans are coordinated with those of the Soviet
Union eyery year.
The development of the Soviet economy in the late I960 1 s and its
increasing ability to export manufactured goods has somewhat altered
the structure of GDR — Soviet trade, although the USSR remains pri-
marily a supplier of raw materials for the GDR. Both countries' rela-
tive economic importance to each other has declined since 1950 — trade
with the GDR formed 16% of Soviet trade in 1951 and 11% in 1977.
19
20
Trade with the USSR formed 43% of the GDR trade in 1951 and 35% in 1977.
Since 1970, bilateral trade has risen at a decreased rate, but bi-
lateral economic relations have stressed closer integration. The day
after the signing of the FRG — Soviet treaty in 1970, the USSR con-
cluded a $25 billion five-year trade and technical cooperation agree-
ment with the GDR, foreseeing a 56% increase in goods exchanged between
19
Ibid.
20 ni_,-,,Philip Windsor, Change in Eastern Europe , (London: Chatham House




the two sides, perhaps to sweeten the pill of Soviet WESTPOLITIK.
The 1975 Soviet--GDR Friendship Treaty stipulated that economic contacts
between the two nations would be intensified, and bilateral trade was
supposed to increase 40% between 1970 and 1980. However, in 1975, the
USSR increased the prices charged for its raw materials, creating
problems in GDR--Soviet— East European relations. It appears that, at
various junctures since then, East Germany has been able to resist
further price rise or at least limit their increase. The GDR's nega-
tive balance with the USSR has grown and in 1978 the GDR agreed to
supply the Soviet Union with technical expertise [and perhaps mercenary
forces) in turn for extra supplies of Soviet oil and gas, while Moscow
granted East Germany extra credits. However, When the GDR announced
its 1980 economic plan, it was clear that its economic problems were
increasing. The 1980 plan lowers the rate of increase for industrial
production, calls for increases in energy imports from the Soviet
22
Union and for increased exports.
Although the GDR remains the most highly developed socialist
society with the 8th highest per capita GNP in the world, and has the
most efficient economic system of any East European country, its eco-
nomic situation has deteriorated in the last few years. Its hard
currency debt was $10.5 billion by the end of 1979, 7% of all GDR
exports to Russia went toward paying for its oil. In 1980, the figure
21
Stanley Radcliffe, p, 160.
International Letter , "Economic Activity in Eastern Europe and




was 25% with a predicted 35% by 1983. Today, East German goods are
only one tenth as important for the Soviet market as are Soviet supplies
for the GDR market. Between 1960 and 1980 Soviet—GDR trade rose by
24
an annual average of 8.8%. While the share of Soviet goods in the
GDR total foreign trade had risen in the 1970s, the GDR's share in
total Soviet foreign trade has fallen. The main East German exports
to the Soviet Union are machinery (70%), machine tools, and equipment
for the chemical industry. The GDR supplies 44% of the USSR's imports
of agricultural machinery, 36% of its rail vehicles, and 23% of its
ships. The USSR supplies the GDR with 89% of its oil, 100% of its
natural gas, 66% of its coal, 80% of its sheet metal, 85% of its
cotton, and 99% of its cut timber. The prices for many of these raw
materials have risen by 50% since 1974, and this is especially serious
25
for the GDR since 84% of its energy imports come from the USSR.
The Soviet Union has, in recent years, been faced with a series
of contradictory policy choices in its economic relations with the
GDR, which continue to elicit ambivilent responses. Inasmuch as the
GDR is the chief supplier of advanced technology to the Soviet Union
and given the fact that East Berlin seeks to substitute consumer
communism for a sense of legitimate national identify, it is in the
Soviet Union's economic and political interest that the GDR continue
to stress its industrial development and higher standard of living






between the Soviet Union and East Germany is a source of increasing
concern to Moscow raising questions and hopes for reunification. As a
result of detente, East Germans have more contacts with West Germans.
Since 85% of the GDR population watches Rest German television eyery
night, they are constantly in a position to compare their standard of
living with that of their West German counterparts. This places extra
pressure on the East German government to stress consumption, and
consumer spending is twice as high in the GDR as in the USSR. East
Germans have far more automobiles, refrigerators and washing machines
than do Soviets. This per capita conspicuously higher standard of
living is obvious not only to Soviet and East European tourists, but
also to the 400,000 Soviet troops in the GDR, who may well question
why they are worse off than the population of the country they are
occupying. They have their own special stores, but they cannot use
the intershops. The Soviet Union may have to choose between discontent
within Eastern Europe over the GDR's privileged position and the im-
perative of maintaining domestic political stability within the GDR
by offering its population an affluent way of life unmatched in any
other socialist country, or loosening the bonds on all East European
countries and allow for a reunified Germany with a free market trading
policy with the USSR. 26




The 6DR has kept pace with the FRG in percentage growth in recent
years, but trails substantially in overall economic output on a scale
of roughly ten to one. The effect on the GDR population of the affluent
neighbor to the West cannot be precisely measured, but with private
consumption of the average East German only 60% of his West German
counterpart, the effect is certainly of some concern to the GDR's
27
leadership.
Growing worker apathy and falling work morale has been noticed in
factories, a problem which Soviet troops and tanks cannot eliminate.
The East German workers are only two-thirds as productive as their
West German counterparts. Although this is partly an outcome of their
economvc system which lacks productive incentives, it is also a result
of falling morale. Moreover, the existance of "Intershop socialism"
serves further to undermine legitimacy. In an attempt to accumulate
as much hard currency as possible, the East German government allows
its citizens to accept West Deutschemarks from relatives in the FRG
and spend them in a variety of hard currency stores which sell goods
unavailable in East Ostmarks stores. Although the system has somewhat
tightened up, the fact remains that in a socialist society one is not
rewarded for work done, but rather one's standard of living depends on





socialism according to the law of each according to the ability of
28
his Western relative.
The economic impact of the FRG on the GDR's economic health is
definitely in dispute. By the terms of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which
established the European Economic Community, the GDR became a de facto
member of the Common Market. Since the FRG treats intra-German trade
as domestic trade, the GDR's products can enter the European Market on
the same terms as that of the FRG. The special benefits the GDR de-
rives as an informal member of the EEC is variously estimated as 18
percent of the GDR's trade portfolio, one third of the GDR's trade
with the FRG, and one percent of the GDR's GNP. There are conflicting
reports about how many East German goods enter the East German market
via West Germany, but whatever the volume of goods, the GDR's privileged
access to the EEC gives both East Germany and the USSR special economic
advantages. Moreover, the GDR also benefits from the 850 million DM
29interest-free "swing" credits between the two Germanies. No one can
dispute the fact that sizeable advantages accrue to the GDR in its
trade with the FRG. Without these benefits, the GDR would almost cer-
tainly not have come as far as it has.
In 1978, inner-German trade constituted 8.8% of total GDR trade
(the GDR regards trade with the FRG as foreign trade). It forms 1.5%
of FRG trade. The GDR imports both raw materials, investment goods







benefits from the FRG, particularly the private money transfers between
30
citizens of the FRG and GDR, transit fees for visitors to the GDR,
and West German payment for the autobahns constructed between Berlin
and Mannheim and Berlin and Hamberg, totalling 2.2 billion DM between
1976 and 1984. The East Germans gain far more financially, both in-
directly and directly, from the FRG than trade statistics alone would
indicate. In general, these gains are also advantages to the USSR,
which indirectly has access to West German technology and manufactures
through the GDR.
31
Even with all this assistance, there remain problems on the horizon
for Honecker and the East German government. The relaxation of con-
trols and economic downturn occurred together. The increase in raw
materials and fuel prices and a growing dollar debt against Western
accounts have impaired living standards, and the proximity to the
glittering West German economy raises fears of domestic turmoil. Another
32
constant source of vexation to the Honecker regime is Berlin.
The 1971 Four Power Agreement is a prime example of Soviet disdain
for East German sensitivities when larger interests are at stake. The
Soviets insist on Four-Power control not only to maintain a lever on
30
The cost of transiting to East Berlin was recently elevated to
4 times the previous charge, apparently an effort by the East German
government to defuse the infection of Polish liberalism and West
German allurements.






the West but to foreclose the possibility of overly warm GDR-FRG
relations. The GDR has overcome the challenge of unification with
the signing of the final act in Helsinki, but not the challenge of
the FRG occupying half of East Germany's capital city, Several in-
cidents in the last few years indicate that Berlin will continue to
be a source of tensions. Traffic disruptions, violent objectives to
the establishment of FRG environmental and antitrust offices in West
Berlin, and periodic threats to the corridors have served as signals
for shifts in Soviet foreign policy in other areas. The GDR acts at
Moscow's bidding in Berlin, in the long run to the benefit of the
West, since the Soviet Union's strategic interests dictate a more
moderate tone. In any case the problem in Berlin has not been solved,
33
only regulated.
Relations with Bonn present East Germany its greatest challenge.
Between 1971 and 1976, approximately 15 million West Germans visited
the East, and the GDR has recently taken various administrative steps
to stem the flow and reduce personal contacts. However, economically
the interchange increases steadily, particularly in light of the GDR's
special EEC status which supports ten percent of East Germany's trade.
The threat Berlin presents to the GDR's security is in the form of an
infectious political virus. The GDR is apparently embarked on a new
strategy of peaceful engagements with the West, in part due to a new
regime and new self confidence, but also because of Soviet encourage-





this relationship on the back burner. However, the GDR is still with-
out a solid national basis and is susceptible to cultural and ideo-
logical encroachment from the FRG. Ultimately, the Soviet Union
34
remains the arbiter of the GDR's fate.
E. CONCLUSION
All these factors serve to undermine Honecker's claim that a
socialist German nationality exists. It is unclear, however, to what
extent the Soviet Union is concerned about the lack of national legiti-
macy in the GDR, On the one hand, as long as the GDR remains the eco-
nomic and military bulwark of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, domestic
tensions are only of secondary importance to the USSR, providing they
remain under control. On the other hand, if the lack of domestic
legitimacy begins to threaten the GDR's stability as an outpost of
Soviet power, then Moscow may have to reconsider its attitude toward
the problem. In the long run, it must be in Moscow's interest that
the GDR develop a sense of national identity different from that of
the Federal Republic.
Both the USSR and the GDR share the same goals toward the FRG:
they want to maximize the economic benefits of the intra-German
rapproachement and minimize its political risks. The GDR's response
to Soviet pressure to improve relations with the FRG was to intensify
Ulbricht's policy of Abgrenzung (demarcation) against the FRG. This





system of the GDR from that of the FR6 and to insulate the East German
population from the potentially destabilizing effects of detente with
West Germany. For instance, whereas before detente (OSTPOLITIK) about
2.5 million West Germans used to visit the GDR ewery year, the current
figure is 8 million (to a country with a population of 17 million!),
with two million (largely senior citizens) East Germans going the other
way.
The GDR has, however, even benefited economically from this aspect
of inner-German relations. East Berlin has increasingly dealt with
its dissident problem by literally selling its trouble makers to the
FRG for hard currency (a normal worker costs about 70,000 DM; an
academic, 160,000 DM). Although this human barter has curious results—
for instance the voluntary imprisonment of hundreds of GDR citizens
hoping to be sold to the West — it has served as a means of ridding
35
the GDR of supposedly undesirable citizens (see Table III).
While both the USSR and the GDR recognize the political disadvan-
tages of the inner-German relationship, the USSR is more aware of its
potential benefits, because it is a superpower with global political
concerns. One reason for Moscow's pressure on East Germany was its
desire to maintain good relations with West Germany, by offering the
FRG concessions in its relations with the GDR. The USSR is conscious,
in its polity toward inner-German relations, of the beneficial effects
of these relations on its ties with the Federal Republic. This is



















































Source: Figures for 1949-1973, DDR-Handbuch
,
(Cologne: Verlag
Weissenschaft und Politik, 1975) p. 313. Figures for 1974
1976 are those of the Federal Ministry of the Interior,
and those for 1977 originate from the West Berlin
Arbeitergemeinschaft 13 August. Moreton, p. 243.
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Berlin fears that closer Soviet ties with the FRG will diminish its
leverage over the USSR. However, while the USSR can use the possibility
of closer ties with the FRG to pressure the GDR, East Berlin can equally
dangle the prospect of closer, autonomous ties with the FRG as a means
of pressuring the USSR, and has done so since the Soviet invasion of
Afganistan, Ultimately, the GDR may exploit the USSR's residual fears
of German reunification to limit the pace of FRG-Soviet relations.
Regardless of this leverage, however, the USSR continues to play
an important role in all intra-German negotiations. For instance,
during the 1974 talks on building an autobahn between West Berlin and
the FRG, the USSR insisted that East Germany consult it on all details
of the arrangements. There have been occasions, however, when the GDR
has negotiated with the FRG on sensitive issues without consulting the
USSR. One way in which the USSR is legally able to control many of
the negotiations between the two Germanies is through the Four-Power
status of Berlin, which the GDR would prefer not to have.
If the Soviet Union and East Germany are wary of the political
effects of inner-German relations, they both derive significant econo-
mic benefits from inner-German trade. The FRG has been willing to pay
a large price for the increase in human contacts between the two
Germanies, indicating the desire is still there for eventual uni fi ca-
tion . The Soviet Union has gained advantages from this. The FRG's
desire to maintain the position that East and West Germany constitute
one nation has led the FRG to develop a special relationship with the
GDR. The GDR and the USSR seem to share the same view of the
145

desirability of inner-German trade, despite differences over the political
aspects of inner-German relations.
Policy makers in Bonn are no doubt right in their expectation that
the increased contacts between the two German societies will lead to a
more stable relationship than in the past. Bonn is still paying sub-
stantial sums of money for the purpose of strengthening relations with
the GDR: the balance of trade between the two Germanies is heavily
favorable to the West, and the GDR's deficit is financed by credits
paid for by the West German tax payer (East Germany— the prodigal
brother). These options are regarded as helping to keep the option




VI. CONCLUSION: THE UNRAVELING OF EASTERN EUROPE
AND THE REALIZATION OF REUNIFICATION
The purpose of this scenario is to depict how events might unfold
in the Europe of the late 1980s and the conditions under which German
reunification might he realized. The remainder of the thesis will
support the scenario by: discussing the incipient transition in Eastern
Europe; the pathway to reunification; and the effect upon the politico-
military alliance systems.
A. SCENARIO
The current unrest in Poland (August, 1986) and the German Democra-
tic Republic appears to be the genesis of the disintegration of Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe. The challenges in Poland and East Germany
can hardly fail to influence events that take place in the rest of
Eastern Europe; their positions are central geographically and politi-
cally to the Soviet Union.
For Poland, the current unrest is the manifestation of a continuum
of inimical feelings between Moscow and Warsaw. Ever since the bloody
quelling of the riots in Warsaw, Gdansk, and Posen in December, 1982,
Polish residents have been seething with revolutionary fervor; senti-
ments have been at a fever pitch since late July. The Polish fever
eventually caught on in East Germany in mid 1985, in spite of the NPA's
attempts to suppress East German workers. There have been multiple
NPA - National Peoples Army, in charge of indiginous security
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arrests of strike leaders in Rostock, Leipzig and Dresden. Factories
in these cities are currently under workers' controls and chants for
German reunification are becoming stronger in Berlin and other cities.
Eric Honecker's replacement, an obscure member of the East German
Poliburo, has failed to consolidate support and the situation is slip-
ping further out of Communist hands. Furthermore, the situation portends
irreversible danger to the current officials, as control of the tele-
vision stations and the newspapers in the major cities have slipped into
the dissidents hands.
The reduction of Soviet troop levels in East Germany was undoubtedly
a contributing factor to the impetus of independence that flows in the
country. The presence of 20 Soviet divisions on German soil had been
a constant reminder of the potential costs to the GDR of any signifi-
cant challenge to Soviet policy. But following the Polish debacle in
1982 and the vociferous clamor for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions by
the Europeans, the Red Army troop levels were significantly reduced.
The election in 1984 of Franz Joseph Strauss as Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany, was another watershed for Germany. Herr
Strauss has revived sentiments for German reunification, substantially
increased inter-German trade, and spirited the East Germans with a
resurgence of German "nationalism" and "Geist." The FRG currently
ranks as the third most productive, industrialized country in the
world. East Germany has not been far behind with the seventh position
in the world ranking; the present volatile situation threatens to
undermine this fast paced economy „ The Soviet Union depends on East
Germany for a large contribution to the Russian economy, especially as
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a supplier of advanced technology. It has been in the Soviet Union's
political and economic interest that the GDR continue to stress its
industrial development and higher standard of living for the population.
However, this growing gap in living standards between the Soviet Union
and the rest of Eastern Europe and East Germany has sparked new ten-
sions in the USSR and the other countries of Eastern Europe, who find
themselves discontent in their execrable living conditions. As this
rise in the economic power of the Germanies accelerates, the German
Democratic Republic is aligning more with the West, especially for
trade, credits and capital investments. This economic situation has
been another destabilizing force in East Germany.
As for the Soviet Union, (under the new leadership troika of
Tikhonov, Andropov, and Gromyko) it is currently grappling with the
problems caused by the mis judgments of the Brezhnevian gerontocracy.
The Brezhnev obsession with considerations of ideology and power
dictated the political priorities and produced the highest peacetime
military budget of a great power for the longest period in history.
This contributed to the neglect of other problems and thus to the
aggravation of some internal as well as external difficulties. The
USSR's technology would become obsolete without Western transfers.
Its agriculture cannot feed its population; the grain transfer approved
by President Haig has kept the Soviets from slow starvation. Even
Soviet oil production has become insufficient and has forced the satel-
lites to turn to the Middle East for oil. It has troubles with its
East European satellites and some of its minorities have become restless
China and South Asia (Afganistan and Vietnam) will continue to command
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increased Soviet attention and resources. Its ideological appeal has
worn thin to third world nations , And it has helped cement politically
its diverse antagonists: the U.S.A., China, Japan, and Western Europe.
Its only remaining historical asset is its growing power; its ability
to intimidate and to coerce, to instill and to exploit fear.
Thus, by 1986 the ascending line of Soviet external potency has
crossed the descending line of Soviet internal political weakness.
The dilemma has presented itself to the new Soviet leaders more sharply
than ever before: either to achieve external successes or turn to
internal reform. Weighting the costs of periodic crises and imbroglios
in Eastern Europe, the Soviets will ease their way to the liberation
of Eastern Europe by providing security without demand for dominance
in state's internal affairs. Closer economic ties with the West both
for the USSR and Eastern Europe will be seen as beneficial and
necessary. Security and economics, in turn, will parlay into a greater
flexibility and tolerance on the part of the Soviet Union toward
Eastern Europe — laying the way for a restructuring of European
security systems. At the same time the United States will experience
mounting political pressure for a further military disengagement from
Europe and will, after a SALT III negotiation, bring all its troops
home. By the end of the 1980's, all of this will ultimately culminate
in the realization of German reunification, the Finlandization of
Eastern Europe and the independence of Western Europe.,
This fabricated situation was designed to presage the restructuring
of Europe. The remainder of this chapter will present the current
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reality of the situation and suggest how the scenario may become
fact.
B. THE PRESENT REALITY
The world is going through a fundamental change. The two-bloc
world is in disrepair; it is not likely to be revived. Polycentrism
is the order of the day as long as submerged national interests re-
assert themselves and the national interests of newly independent
2
states come to the fore. This alters the implications of the German
problem, putting it in a changed perspective for many of those in-
volved. There is less of the old emphasis on Germany as a prize to
be won in the struggle between the blocs; there is more — although
still halting — emphasis on Germany as the linchpin to the restruc-
turing of Europe. At the same time, Germany appears to have shaken
off a long concern with immediate material needs and unswavering
alignment with one bloc — there is a growing propensity not to allow
others to decide her destiny. Chancellor Schmidt has had many contacts
and made economic deals with the Soviet Union. To say that he is des-
tined to be the next DeGaulle of Europe is perhaps a bit strong, but
he is definately striving for more independence. In addition, the
change in Germany reflects similar changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe--
a demand for more autonomy and nationalism.
The point is that a new era for an old problem has begun. The
Germans are no longer content that some day Germany will be reunified
2
Harry Swartz, Eastern Europe in the Soviet Shadow
,
(New York
The Hohn Day Company, 1973, pp„ 72-73
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simply because the division is, as Brandt put it, contrary to human
and Divine law. Of course the fact that the wish for unity is in-
creasingly supplemented by the conviction that effective implementation
of the wish (or chimera, as some would have it) must somehow be achieved
does not mean that success will result. But it is reasonable to assume
that a prolonged lack of future progress (especially in view of the
convulsions of Eastern Europe) will be increasingly dangerous to all
those involved. The status quo (a la Metternich) can not be imposed
when the tempo in the life of nations increases; when the tempo in-
creases, something will come of it.
What, then, will come of this problem, and under what circumstances
are the major alternatives likely to be realized? Those questions will
be answered in the succeeding pages
„
Co EASTERN EUROPE IN TRANSITION — FINLANDIZATION?
1. Politics of Eastern Europe
The 1980-81 liberalism in Poland not only compromised Communism,
it also caused ominous cracks in the Soviet bloc. Though Russia has
managed to retain the strongest position in the Communist camp, the
Kremlin's domination over other members has been questioned and left
seriously impaired.
The Hungarian revolution showed the way to a new social order:
political democracy; safeguarding civic freedom; free association of
workers, peasants, and other professions; and a mixed economic system
with both collective and private ownership. The epoch-making importance
of the Hungarian Revolution lay in that it was not only a revolt
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against communist tyranny, but also that it established at the same
3
time the positive aims of a new social order.
Today, Hungary has retained pieces of that liberalism that was
crushed by the Russians in 1956, but the Hungarian regime has been
cagier and quieter about its advances. The Hungarians have recently
accelerated their plans for a five-day work week. Hungarians now
working the triple shift system (a 44 hour week) will go over to the
shortened week in July. The rest of the country's 4.5 million labor
force will have it next year.
Hungary has been the only East European country to refrain from
criticizing Poland's industrial unrest and the emergence of its in-
dependent union movement.
Unions in Hungary are autonomous and have extensive powers over
management decisions on basic wage questions, annual leave, and alloca-
tion of housing. Some have a voice in hiring and firing. They must
be consulted about manager-director appointments and, though they
may not veto a ministry nomination, if they have objections, these are
5
taken seriously into account.
This year the Hungarians are tackling the feather bedding of
failing enterprises and wage differences. Each is a highly sensitive
3
Robert G. Wesson, The Russian Dilemma , (New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1974, p. 108.
4
Christian Science Monitor , February 17, 1981, p. 10.
5
Wesson, Russian Dilemma, pp. 83, 194.
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subject in the Communist countries with their ideological, but often
seriously uneconomic commitment to full employment.
The minimum wage is being raised by 8 percent; maximums may go up
as much as 25 percent. This means a break with the once-rigid
egalitarianism and is intended to reward the qualified expert and
the skilled worker. Sounds like a long way from Soviet-style com-
munism? It is.
The profound developments in Czechoslavakia in 1968 presented a
confused challenge to the Soviet leadership. The resignation of
Moscow's protegee, Novotny, the reformist forces of Dubcek's leader-
ship and the revival of freedom of the press, had created, from the
Soviet point of view, a dangerous political situation in one of the
most important countries of Eastern Europe. The situation had every
potential for infecting other East European countries with the passion
of reform — any may have done so had not the Soviets come crashing
down.
Now that Peking has become the second centre of the Communist
world, insisting on equality with Moscow, the Soviets are rife with
dilemmas. Poland, leaning on China and the West, and entertaining
friendship with Yogoslavia, tries to follow her own road. Despite all
the efforts to force her back to the folds of "Mother Russia," she
can no longer be considered a dependable ally. Yugoslavia is constant-
ly involved with Russia and her Communist pawns. Yugoslavia shows no
Christian Science Monitor , Feb 17, 1981, p. 10.
Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968 ,
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1974), p a 12.
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signs of leaping at any time to the support of the Kremlin. Rumania,
as well, insists on a 'wayward 1 course in foreign policy, albeit the
domestic constraints imposed by Ceaucescu are quite repressive.
Moscow is justifiably worried, realizing that its exclusive
supremacy over the Communist camp has been seriously challenged. Its
authority has begun its plunge in Eastern Europe. The subjugated
countries can no longer be trusted. Communist rulers may swear al-
legiance to Moscow with great servility, but, they speak only for
themselves. And by trying to enforce this loyalty to Moscow by
persecution, they themselves are merely admitting the poverty of
their leadership. Czech Communists live in permanent deference to
the Soviets. Honecker could be swept away if the twenty Soviet Divi-
sions were to leave East Germany. Belgrade alone, at present, rejects
Soviet supremacy openly, but elsewhere Communist regimes remain in
power only because of the fear of Soviet military intervention.
2. Military Forces of Eastern Europe
The tasks imposed on the Red Army have grown monstrously. The
satellite armies are of dubious value to Moscow. In the 1956 Polish
uprising, the effort to win the Polish Army over to Russia by putting
in charge Polish-born Red Army Marshal Rokossoviski , failed dismally.
The Polish Army then, and today, seems willing to fight against
Soviet units . Hungarian soldiers joined the revolution against Moscow
at the very beginning. The Communist general, Maleter, organized
the defense in Budapest against attacking Soviet divisions. Even of-
ficers considered loyal communists gave themselves to the service of
the revolutionaries. In the Czech crisis, Dubcek did not mobilize
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the Czechoslovak!' an armed forces and civilians and was adverse to
bloodshed with the Russians. The dismissal of Czech General Prchlik,
designed to diffuse the crisis, unfortunately strengthened the cause
o
of the interventionists in Moscow.
In an emergency, the eighty satellite divisions might form a
kernel of revolt rather than an auxiliary force of the Red Army.
Partisans would harass the Soviet military machine over the whole
wide area between the Baltic and the Mediterranean (excluding Bulgaria)
This would cause the Soviet divisions to be pinned down in all the
regions now oppressed by the Russian dictatorship. Unless they believe
in deluding themselves, the rulers in the Kremlin cannot fail to real-
ize the proven unreliability of the satellite armies, as well as the
danger of revolt and sabotage if there was a war. The so-called
'strengthening' of the Warsaw alliance, stressed in many declarations
issued by the Communist government since the Hungarian uprising, has
no other practical meaning other than to supply the Russian government
with a specious legal pretext for maintaining garrisons and bases for
aircraft, naval units and guided missiles in the captive countries.
The Red Army is the only force in East Central Europe on which Moscow
can depend. It is significant that the number of Soviet instructors




Bulgaria historically hewed to Moscow's wishes.
156

East German unrest of 1953, the Hungarian uprising of 1956, the Prague
Spring of 1968 and the present Polish revolt.
Unlike the armies of other East European states, the GDR NVA
(National Peoples' Army) is a product of the Warsaw Treaty Organiza-
tion and it serves under the control of the Supreme Command of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization. NVA troops are among the best equipped
and best trained in East Europe, the second most effective after the
Red Army. In order to maintain discipline and subordination, there
are constant high-level military contacts between the NVA and Red
Army, and all leading GDR military personnel are trained in the
Soviet Union. So far, the NVA has served Soviet interests, not only
12
on GDR soil but also in East European and African operations.
However, the fundamental morale of the NVA has to be held in question.
If a war were to break out between the Soviet Union and Western Europe,
would East German soldiers be willing to fight in a fratricidal con-
flict with their West German brothers? While the efficiency and
effectiveness of the NVA is no doubt a military boon to the Soviet
Union, Moscow must be careful to choose their conflicts wisely.
The substantial changes taking place in Eastern Europe have ex-
tended beyond the military spectrum — the more complex and deeper
Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the German Democratic
Republic," Unpublished Report, 1980 p. 24.
Ibid.
12
In Angola and Ethiopia. Recently, they have been pointed out
as a putative source for arms to Salvadorian guerrillas.
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problems of economics pose a far greater challenge to continued Soviet
dominance.
3. The Economic Path to Finlandization
The economic morass created by social revolution and forced
industrialization and collectivization is a fundamental element in the
declining fealty of the East European countries to the Soviet Union.
The promised plan of prosperity and stability has only resulted in
the magnification of old tensions and inchoate resentments. Although
the post-war economies of Eastern Europe evolved into a new productive
capacity, the failure of the regimes to satisfy the demands of indus-
trial workers and the new intelligensia (supposed supporters and
beneficiaries of the new socialist order), has added new discontents
to the persistant grievances of peasants opposed to collectivization,
religious people shocked by the persecution and denial of the churches,
diehard nationalists espousing personal and national freedoms hostile
to the communist milieu. Open dissent and violence a la Poland are
but the most spectacular manifestations of the unanticipated effects
of economic and social change.
The limits of extensive growth in simple basic industries
became apparent in most states in the 1960's, and the system had
neither the resiliency nor the effective political control to adapt
to the new requirements. The issue of economic reform posed a test
for the economists, the planners, and the high political officials
of each country as they tried to decide how much decentralization,




the system. However, party satraps feared that experimentation with
changes would erode their power bases. When Czechoslavakia and Hungary
in 1968 embarked on economic reform as an alternative to stagnation,
the results were disastrous for Czechoslavakia, Hungary delicately
transformed the economy so as not to disturb the political balance or
provide "fraternal assistance."
The experience of the 1970's has sharpened the dilemmas and
highlighted the narrow choice of options open to the East European




— hi gh energy prices, technological backwardness, consumer demands,
inefficient industries, balance of payments deficits, mounting inter-
national debt, and the rigidities of the economic structure— remains
to be seen. In any case it is obvious that the Soviet Union can not
provide the panacea for this sea of troubles.
4. Prospects for the Future
It has been over three decades since the Soviets made the
decision to indirectly control Eastern Europe. In that time they have
failed to develop a stable, dependable and viable system. The bloc-
14
wide institutions of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA have not created
a true community. The prospects for the Soviet Union itself are fore-
boding—declining economic growth; slow technological progress;
13
Richard C, Gripp, The Political System of Communism, (New York
Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 91-101.
CMEA—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance— The Socialist
equivalent to the Marshall Plan organized in 1949.
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serious problems of manpower; a heavy military drain on resources,
social problems of divorce, alcoholism, and abortion; and a shortage
of available energy. In the absence of a drastic reform of the system
or a rapprochement and great expansion of trade with the West, the
Soviet Union may be forced to focus on itself, squeezing the most out
of its own resources and denying further adventurism. How would this
situation affect the East European countries? The USSR certainly
could not make up for its paucities by squeezing her neighbors. They
will have similar problems, many of them in more acute form for they
are more dependent on international trade and credits, more energy
deficient, and hampered by the communist rigidity that pervades the
political system and strangles economic reform. The Soviets cannot
continue to draw on their own declining resources to help satellite
regimes that are floundering. Credits, preferential prices, emergency
aid, and Soviet oil and gas cannot continue as contributions.
What is the solution to this seemingly inevitable succession
of crises that lie ahead? Albeit the Soviets have the military
primacy to control unrest and possible explosions in Eastern Europe,
there are alternative solutions that could provide security and
ameliorated economic interdependence without Soviet insi stance on
control of internal affairs. The Finlandization of Eastern Europe
and neutralization of the Germanies might provide the solution to the
explosive dilemmas of the Soviet Union.
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D. THE ROAD TO THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY
It is evident that Soviet foreign policy has entered a period of
increased difficulties and complications: the Polish unrest poses a
formidable problem and threatens to infect the other East European
countries; relations with the United States have been steadily deteriora-
ting; the Marxist Leninist ideology is beginning to look feeble even to
the third world; and relations with China don't auger for improvement.
Can the West, then, take advantage of the Soviet Union's increasing
problems to force or induce a Soviet retreat from East Germany?
The concept of building strength until the Soviets were ultimately
forced to make concessions has a fatal psychological flaw. It is true
that nations sometimes sacrifice some prestige to avoid war. The
Soviets did exactly that in the Cuban Missile Crisis. But it should
not be forgotten that they were not being asked to turn Cuba over to
the U. S. The United States demand was much more moderate than that.
If the United States had insisted on completely humiliating the Soviets,
it is doubtful they would have chosen to avoid war. It is quite pos-
sible to envisage solutions in which the Soviets might find it practical
or desirable to withdraw from East Germany. But it is not at all
likely that they would simply turn East Germany over to NATO for nothing
in return. The security of the Soviet Union in the West depends on
adequate arrangements regarding Germany. The weaker the position of
the Soviets, when what is at stake is vital, the more they must hope
to bluff through and hold out. Soviet control over Poland and East
Central Europe could be loosened under certain conditions, but these
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areas cannot be simply abandoned by the Soviets as a second step in a
Western political offensive. The Soviets would be forced to try to
hold on while their determination to do so would be in doubt -- surely
a very dangerous situation for any nation.
So far, the problem has been discussed in terms of a simple and
unilateral withdrawal from weakness. Another possibility exists: the
Soviets might withdraw if the West would withdraw too.
Such a process might occur yery gradually, and perhaps almost
tacitly, or by a formal agreement executed in relatively compact stages.
But in either event it would be a program of matched concessions in
East--West troop dispositions and East— West alliance obligations.
And at the end of the process both German states would be joined in a
single all-German government which would be under formal obligation
to refrain from military alliances with East or West. The whole
arrangement would have to be further strengthened by a European Security
Pact which would guarantee Germany against attack and Germany's
neighbors against German aggression.
Such a plan has at least once been given tentative approval by a
Soviet administration. In February 1955, when this plan -- which also
provided for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland — was pre-
sented at the Warsaw interparliamentary conference on the German
question, 150 delegates, "including representatives from the Soviet
Union," voted unanimously to offer negotiations on free, controlled
15
elections in Germany. The plan went beyond the Soviet offers at
15-
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the Berlin Conference — specifically in accepting the Eden formula
1 fi
for elections, the proposition that there would be a single German
state constituted in this fashion, and the proposal that the Soviets
should withdraw from Poland. It left vague the important question of
what degree of armament restrictions this "neutralized" Germany would
be asked to accept.
It is possible to argue that the Soviet government was merely
engaging in a propaganda gesture at Warsaw. But its official note
and other pronouncements had successively failed to arouse Western
response, and it is more likely that they used this approach to suggest
their serious intentions. Malenkov's sudden demise lends weight to
18
this interpretation.
There is a distinct and important difference between carrying out
such a plan in conjunction with the reunification of Germany, and
carrying it out while keeping Germany divided (as was proposed at one
point at the German Conference by Molotov). The plan's usefulness
as a basis for negotiation would be completely negated if it envisaged
two weak, neutral German states. For one thing, the West Germans
The Eden Plan, submitted on Jan 29, 1954 aimed at "the conclusion
of a freely negotiated treaty with a United Germany to be arrived at
by stages: 1) free elections throughout Germany, 2) the convocation
of the resulting National Assembly, 3) the drafting of a constitution,
4) the formation of an all -German government responsible for the
negotiation of the peace treaty, 5) the signing and ratification of
the treaty.
Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds
, p. 162.
18
Malenkov's forced resignation took place on Feb 8, 1955 two
days after the Warsaw interparliamentary conference on Germany ended.
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could not agree to such a plan. On the other hand, a plan to create
a militarily neutral Germany carries with it greater Soviet concessions
than might be apparent. First, a united Germany, whether or not arma-
ment restrictions were imposed, would continue to be a relatively strong
power, anti-Communist and pro-Western in orientation. A militarily
neutral Germany would not be a feeble Germany or a Germany neutral in
its preferences for one way of life over another. Second, in secret
and really free elections, the Communists in East Germany would be
utterly wiped out. (This is exactly what Khrushchev said about the




Why would the Soviets have any interest in agreement to a plan
which, although it took West Germany out of NATO, also took East Germany
out of the Soviet bloc and essentially eliminated the socialist frame-
work of East German life?
There are a number of reasons. First, the Soviets currently are
threatened with military involvement in Poland that could extend to
other East European countries. If a new revolt took place in East
Germany, the danger of escalation would be very great. The last revolt
in East Germany, in June 1953, occurred while West Germany was still
disarmed and neither truly independent nor responsible for German
affairs. Now active West German forces total a half million, and the
trained reserves have reached substantial figures. It would no longer
be a simple matter for the West German government to take refuge in
19
Wesson, The Russian Dilemma, p. 37,
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inactivity while East Germans were being slaughtered by Soviet tanks.
As long as the Soviets remain in Germany they are gambling that they
will not be forced, as in Hungary, to choose between bloody suppres-
sion and evacuation.
Secondly, the difficulties the Soviets are finding themselves in
are increasing. Mr. Brezhnev has built the Soviet Union into a
genuine superpower, with unprecedented military might. But, despite
that, the tanks and warplanes have not snuffed out what the Soviet
media scorns as "rebel gangs" in Afganistan. Nor does the Army seem
to promise a palatable antidote to worker unrest in Poland. Nor is
the military particularly helpful in underpinning an intricately
planned economy that often just doesn't work. Furthermore, Secretary
Brezhnev's version of detente has forged unprecedented trade links
with the West, particularly with West Germany. But relations with
Europe are strained. Relations with Washington are worse. Nor are
the Soviets on the best of terms with Communist Parties in Europe.
The Italians, Spanish, and French did not send their number one men
to Moscow. And Sino-Soviet relations are faring no better than in
recent years.
The Soviet advantage used to lie in the fact that some of the
satellite states suffered at the hands of the Nazis and feared German
expansionism. But since the West Germans threw off the shackles of
the Hall stein Doctrine (which barred the establishment of diplomatic
relations with any state, other than the Soviet Union, that recognized
East Germany) and supplemented their economic missions in the area




There is, in short, already a well advanced trend toward drastically
changed relations in Eastern Europe. The satellites do not want to be
satellites, with the possible exception of Bulgaria. Under these cir-
cumstances, and in view of German sentiments and Polish initiative as
well as the Soviets' economic burden in the East, there is far more
reason for the Soviets to make some suitable arrangement for the whole
of Eastern Europe.
Thus positive and negative considerations combine to make the
Soviets potentially more willing to consider some degree of liquida-
tion of their East European position.
No one can foresee the outcome of the growing difficulties and
sharpening tensions inside the Communist world. But the whole Com-
munist empire is being shaken by conflicting social and national
forces — and by powerful spiritual currents. Now that the spirit of
freedom has been released, anything can happen. But whatever the
course of events that lead to a European settlement the forces in the
Soviet Empire will not be able to achieve the liberation of the
people of East Central Europe without realizing the solution to the
German Question and employing effective political aid from the Western
Powers to effect such solutions.
E. A NEW POLITICAL SETTLEMENT: NATO AND WARSAW PACT
The radical change in the strategic orientation of the United
States, Britain and France, who are concentrating more and more on
tactical nuclear weapons, may lead to paradoxical consequences. While
the danger of a general nuclear war diminishes to a minimum, the
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defensive capabilities of Western Europe would be weakened, the more so
if the number of American and British forces in Europe were to be dras-
tically reduced. Our military value compared with Russia's strength is
not perhaps great, but the politico-economic value is tremendous. Our
presence on the Continent is a dependable, and perhaps the only, guarantee
that the Western Powers would automatically repulse a Soviet attack with
their nuclear weapons. It is understandable that the Russians should
strive by every means to destroy NATO, which would mean the withdrawal
of American bases not only on the Continent, but also in Britain. Sim-
ilarly, one can understand why the Russians refuse to link the question
of disarmament with that of the political settlement of controversial
European issues; they simply want to retain their position in East
Germany and in East Central Europe,,
As long as Germany remains divided and independence is denied to
subjugated Communist nations, Western Europe will continue to be suscep-
tible to the dangerous political pressures of Russia, pressures that
could only be increased after any reduction in the number of American
and British troops stationed on the Continent. Attempts to arrange for
general disarmament will fail until the two main European problems,
German reunification and liberation of the satellite countries, have
been tackled satisfactorily. To experienced negotiators, there can be
no disarmament without security and no security without a political
settlement to satisfy all interested partners.
The Western governments will not accept any Soviet proposals intended




of the idea of German unification was made with the caveat that
unification should be under Communism. The East German leadership may
have raised the reunification issue, an issue that strikes a responsive
cord in the hearts of East German people, in order to soften West German
reaction to any eventual Soviet-bloc intervention in Poland. It may
also have been done to give the East German people something to talk
and think about, other than the example being set in Poland. In any
case, recent events point out the subject of reunification is quite
alive in Germany, even if the proposal was untenable from the Western
21
viewpoint.
It is possible to visualize a political settlement that would make
a new system of European security practicable. The Western governments,
including Herr Schmidt's Federal Republic, will not accept any Soviet
proposals intended to extend Soviet influence throughout Germany. On
the other hand, Moscow will reject any proposals for reunification un-
less they include guarantees against a unified Germany becoming a member
of the Atlantic Alliance. A settlement can only be envisaged if Germany
becomes united through free elections and gives a pledge to refuse the
blandishments of military blocs. In all other things, Germany could
be a truly sovereign power with a limited army defense force of her own.
This could also be subject to restrictions similar to those imposed on
other states by a general disarmament agreement.
20
The idea of German reunification has not been aired publicly at
the official level since the 1960s. Honecker broke the silence on the
issue this month (Feb 81).
21
CSM 18 Feb 81.
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The men in the Kremlin will not withdraw from East Central Europe
unless they are assured that this region will not be used as a staging
area for an assault on Russia. A settlement could be based on an under-
taking by each government, created in these territories by free elections,
to remain neutral. Such a pledge could be internationally guaranteed.
On the whole, in their foreign policy, Germany could follow the example
of Austria; while Czechoslavakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania followed
the example of Finland.
Such a settlement would be completed by the simultaneous withdrawal
of Western soldiers from West Germany and Soviet troops from East Germany
and East Central Europe. The reduction of American and British forces
in other West European countries could come with the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Eastern Europe or depend on the progress of general
disarmament, depending on what negotiators work out.
An interview with George Kennan revealed the following. When the
interviewer asked Mr. Kennan why Soviet troops don't get out of Eastern
Europe, he responded that the situation directly involved the German
Problem, so long as American and other Western forces remain in West
Germany. Mr. Kennan posited that we should consider the idea of with-
22
drawing all American forces from the Continent of Europe. He went on
to suggest that Germany's frontiers would be guaranteed by the English
and American atomic deterrent.
22
Interview of George Kennan in The Two Germanies , edited by Grant
S. McClellan, pp. 137-138.
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Agreement on these proposals could be embodied in a new European
security system or at least become a basis for such a system, guaranteed
by everybody concerned, including the United States, the Soviet Union
and the United Nations. This security system could be linked at the
23
same time, with a disarmament agreement.
Concern about the possibility of the American withdrawal, not only
from West Germany but from the whole of Europe, may be a stumbling block
in negotiations. But, would the United States lose interest in the
defense of Europe if a physical presence on the Continent weren't main-
tained? Surely this would be one more reason for becoming even more
active in the defense of Europe.
23
Different suggestions and plans, analygous to these proposals,
have been submitted by distinguished statesmen from time to time. In
1957, Hugh Gaits kill of the House of Commons proposed the following:
"The path to be followed seems to me an expression of the Eden plan
put forward in 1955. It was at that time proposed that there should be
a withdrawal of forces from the frontiers between East and West Germany,
leaving within Germany itself a zone in which there were no foreign
troops. Would it not be possible to extend the area of such a zone
until it covered, say, the whole of Germany, Poland, Czechoslavakia
and Hungary — and, if possible, Rumania and Bulgaria"?
Franz Joseph Strauss, leader of the CSU/CDU opposition party in the
FRG espoused an even bolder plan in his book, The Great Design : "The
unification of Germany cannot be achieved either by force or by the
acceptance of Soviet conditions. The attempt to use forcible methods
would mean unification in a cemetary and acceptance of Soviet conditions
would in the long run mean unification in a common prison. ...The in-
dispensable political bargaining counter in this grand design must be
to leave no hope whatsoever in Moscow that Germany is prepared to sur-
render the right of self determination. We are ready to submerge our
national aspirations in membership of an all European Federation. What
we are not ready to do is to abandon our national rights and human
liberties by accepting the present division in the country and perpetua-
ting the status quo. It is up to us Europeans to establish a European
framework, to create a European architecture in which a united Germany
could be absorbed.
.
..Such a Europe should retain close alliance with
the United States. It should possess the means of self defense up to
and including the possession on the nuclear deterrent...."
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Another possible objection against the plan is that it lacks any
guarantee that the Soviet armies would not return to the countries they
had left, especially after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.
This fear is not unfounded,, It would be necessary to insist on the
United States and the other Western powers giving an explicit warning
that they would answer such Soviet aggression with a nuclear counter
attack. It would be necessary, too, to guarantee, in this kind of agree-
ment, modified free elections in the countries of East Central Europe.
As long as the present Communist regime remains in power, there will
always be the danger that a Moscow sycophant will ask for "fraternal
assistance.
"
It is true that after a plan of this kind had been accepted, the
Russians would retain their military superiority on the Continent. But
even if we do not take into account that a united Germany and the
"liberated" countries of East Central Europe would have their own armies,
ready to defend their national independence, it would be far better for
Russia to start an offense from her own frontiers through a buffer belt,
rather than from the Elbe River.
It would be delusory to contend that the objections and misgivings
mentioned are unfounded. But it is worthwhile to consider the superior
advantages of the suggested plan. They seem to outweigh, to a great
extent, any of the risks that must be taken in putting the proposals
into practice.
The main advantage of the plan rests in the fact that, while the
menacing superiority of Soviet power in Europe would be greatly reduced,
the security of Russia itself would be in no way endangered. This also
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would provide truly favorable conditions for peaceful co-existance or
friendly trade competition between the East and West. The tension that
now exists in Western Europe would be vitiated if the Soviets would with-
draw behind their own frontiers. Germany would be reunited. The nations
of East Central Europe would be free.
The balance of power may swing to the benefit of the West in spite
of Russia's still remaining the strongest power on the continent. Western
civilization may once more influence the whole of Central Europe. At
the same time, the influence of the Russian civilization could also be
felt where it was genuinely appreciated. In some ways the Russian secur-
ity might be enhanced,, The Russians would have no further need to fear
the aggressive intentions of the Germans. Yet this fear would exist
even if the Germans disavowed NATO and military alliances. Only a plan
that involved Germany in the general scheme of European peace could
bring comfort to the Russians.
True enough, the Russians would lose their supremacy over their
satellites, but even so they would gain. They would no longer need to
watch for contumacious tendencies. They would no longer need to supply
diminished energy resources to ungrateful European clients. Instead of
being enslaved, these countries might become their partners and neigh-
bors. Instead of being burdensome rebels, they would be cash customers.
Russian economic co-operation with these nations would bring them more
benefit than is possible now when they are obliged to maintain an en-
forced dominion over these countries. The people of Eastern Europe have
a profound hatred of Soviet tyranny, (with the possible exception of
Bulgaria, which is more Byzantine and was protected from the Turks by
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Russia). Once free, they may desire nothing more sincerely than peace and
friendly cooperation with everybody, Russia included.
E. SOVIET REACTION TO THE PLAN
The advantages of such a settlement of European problems are sufficient
to explain why the Western Powers should take the initiative in making
the necessary preliminary moves toward negotiations.
Of course, it is not likely that the Soviet Government would accept
this plan in the present situation. The Russians have not yet relinquished
the hope of realizing their expansive aims as Afganistan, Vietnam and
Central America have vividly pointed out. But I am convinced that the
Western Powers, in presenting these proposals to the Russians, would
strengthen their moral and political position without losing anything.
Their initiative could drive the Soviets into a precarious defensive.
If Moscow were to refuse such a proposal, it might incite the whole
German nation against Russia and hopefully drive it into the embrace of
the West. Germany, eagerly hoping to attain the neutral status enjoyed
by Austria, would grow dangerously restive; the other East Central
European countries looking to enjoy the same status as Finland would
also grow recalcitrant.
Moscow would lose much of the sympathy of the 3rd World nations,
who would realize even more clearly than during the Hungarian Revolution,
Czech uprising and Polish revision, that this negative attitude of the
Russians to the plan was further proof of the Kremlin's imperialistic
aims and intentions. Moscow's attitude would obviously be critized in
Europe, North and South America, China, and in the African countries.
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This could only lead to new and serious frictions among the Soviet
leaders.
Bold initiative from the Western democracies would forestall similar
initiative from Moscow. The resources of the Russians are overstrained
and since the Polish uprising they have encountered serious difficulties
in the satellite countries. Brezhnev has involuntarily exposed Russian
vulnerability by discussing the satellite countries more often and more
carefully than before, stressing repeatedly and with noticeable irritation
that these countries will remain in u the Socialist camp'.
The Soviets may try, in certain circumstances, to escape from their
predicament by granting further autonomy to the East European countries,
even at the price of a considerable diminishing of the influence of the
Communist parties. They might, at the same time, revise their attitude
to the German question. If they were to decide, because of the growing
opposition of the satellites, to content themselves with having a
decisive influence over them, instead of the present exploiting domina-
tion, they could gradually bring about a state in which these nations
might become resigned to enjoying considerable autonomy in the adminis-
tration of their own internal affairs. The Russians could even gain
the sympathy of the Germans if they were to facilitate their reunifica-
tion. Through similar adjustments, Communist leaders could stabilize
their influence in East Central Europe and probably extend it to the
Rhine. This would mean they would become even more dangerous rivals to
the West than before. At present the Western Powers are protected
against this danger mainly by the intractability of Moscow itself.
Quite understandably the Russians do not want to forfeit this direct
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domination over East Central Europe, fearing that any relaxation of their
tyranny might put the whole regime in jeopardy. Inner pressures may force
the Soviet leaders to realize that Stalin's empire cannot be preserved
intact for ever.
Necessity may press Moscow's new leaders to try to transform their
empire into a commonwealth under Russian leadership. If this happened,
the Russian 'sphere of influence' would probably spread even over the
rest of Western Europe and we would see the Finlandization of Western
Europe.
If the West does not want or cannot use 'a policy of strength'
against the Soviet Government, it can only prevent the danger of Moscow's
influence growing by boldly achieving a political settlement that would
lead to the withdrawal of the Red Army from the centre of Europe to
beyond the Russian frontiers. This could only be done through a com-
promise agreement with Moscow, that in its turn would bring counter-
balanced benefits to everybody, including the nations of East Central
Europe.
,
G. DIPLOMACY OF THE WESTERN POWERS
Soviet rulers, dizzy with the cult of power and the merciless
application of force, would abandon their positions in East Central
Europe only under pressure of necessity. The Western Powers can bring
about Soviet compliance by firm policy, elastic, imaginative diplomacy
and thoughtful propaganda. I believe the present administration of
Reagan-Haig is capable of this genre of diplomacy.
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Firm policy should be based above all on a resolute determination
to preserve and strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. Whatever weakens
this, strengthens Russia. Any effective negotiations with Moscow pre-
supposes unbreakable solidarity of the Western Powers, based on the
military power of NATO. Until a settlement about the main controversial
issues in Europe and Asia is reached, the existence of a strong Western
bloc remains vital for the whole free world, as well as for all those
behind the Iron Curtain who yearn for freedom. That is why it would be
very dangerous to consider any withdrawal of American and British troops
from Europe before a settlement of the main causes of tension between
the free world and the Communist world.
The firm policy of the West -- as far as Europe is concerned —
should manifest itself in an emphatic declaration that the Atlantic
Powers consider both German reunification and the restoration of the
freedom and independence of the nations of East Central Europe funda-
mental conditions of any political settlement or agreement with the
USSR. In spite of numerous declarations the Western Powers have had
difficulty in proclaiming, in any statement worthy of being called a
pledge, that the peaceful liberation of the nations of East Central
Europe was a basic principle of their foreign policy.
Because the so-called liberation policy was restricted mainly to
the field of propaganda the Russians felt justified in ignoring it.
If Secretary Haig were to officially proclaim the peaceful liberation
of the Central European nations a definite aim of the Western powers,
the Soviet Government would be forced to give serious consideration
to what was being said, especially as any such declaration could
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encourage all the satellite nations living in a state of latent revolt
against Soviet domination.
The effect of such a declaration could be even stronger if the
Western Powers proclaimed at the same time that they would consider the
neutral status of the liberated nations of East Central Europe as a
suitable and desirable part of a new system of Continental security.
They would clearly prove in this way that they have no intention of
exploiting the liberation of these nations to embarrass Russia. They
should emphasize that they wish to liberate the satellites merely in
accordance with internationally recognized principles governing the right
of every nation to freedom and independence.
Their readiness to guarantee the neutrality of Central European
nations would also prove their belief that the wide strip between the
Baltic and the Mediterranean, in the past so often an excuse for discord
and conflicting ambitions among the Great Powers, should become a region
of peaceful and friendly co-operation.
Such a declaration of the Western Powers could profoundly embarrass
the Russians, especially if it were stressed at the same time that the
proposed political settlement v/ould open the way to real and substantial
disarmament. On this basis it would be possible to mobilize world
opinion against Russian inflexibility and greatly stimulate the hopes
of the satellite countries, third world nations and of many Russians,
too, that the days of Communist dictatorship were numbered.
The plan I have outlined should be accompanied by wide propaganda.
People on both sides of the Iron Curtain should be told of the purely
peaceful aims of the plan. Public opinion in Russia cannot exist in
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the same sense or even to the same extent as in the free countries. Yet
it exists, especially among the Soviet intelligensia and bureaucracy.
These people have limited opportunities at least of listening from time
to time to foreign broadcasts. So the Western Powers should repeat on
every appropriate occasion that they have no hostile intentions toward
Russia or her people. It should be emphasized that they sincerely wish
to co-operate with them. It should also be frequently stressed that
the Western Powers have no intention of interfering with any attempts
made by the Russians to reach a political agreement with the now enslaved
nations. This answers Soviet propaganda repeatedly asserting the 'the
Western imperialists' aim at the destruction of Russian administration
and the disintegration of the United States of Soviet Russia.
The Western Powers should constantly reaffirm that they have no
intention of supporting any attempt to restore any of the regimes that
existed in Eastern Europe before they came under the influence of the
Red Army's Commissars or of enforcing their own political and social
systems on the peoples in Communist-dominated territories. The Western
Powers should merely reiterate that they are ready to recognize and to
respect any regimes that emerge from free elections. Let us not forget
the impact of the Communist propaganda that continues to repeat to the
workers in Russia and the enslaved countries that the fall of Communism
would bring not only a return of capitalism but also unemployment.
Russian broadcasts constantly v/arn the peasants in Central Europe of
the danger of restoring the large private estates. It is taken for
24






The Polish, Hungarian, and Czech uprisings clearly revealed the
aspirations of all dominated nations. This helped the Western democra-
cies in preparing a new policy (and the propaganda to go with it,
especially during the Polish crisis). Their last doubts, if they existed
at all, were dispersed. It was all too obvious that all the nations of
East Central Europe passionately desire liberation, not only from Soviet
domination but from local Communist tyranny as well. Hungarian revolu-
tionaries expressed the wishes of all these nations when they asked for
neutral status and free and peaceful co-operation with all other nations,
including Russia. Polish and Hungarian rebels proved that they wished
neither to return to capitalism nor to retain Communism. They desired
instead a new liberal and Socialist democratic order. Voices from the
other captive countries make a similar plea whenever they have an oppor-
tunity for making themselves heard. The West would greatly help the
people behind the Iron Curtain if, through its policy, diplomacy and
propaganda, it would support these desires.
H. CONCLUSION
Communism has lost its old appeal. No longer does it fill people
with overwhelming, impetuous zeal. Its influence is waning. But behind
the Iron Curtain there is a renaissance of liberal Socialism, character-
ized by a renewed respect for spiritual and religious values. Marxist
materialism is being superseded by a new spiritualism or humanism, con-
ceived socially. The Eurocommunists have sometimes, at their best,
exemplified this form of zeal.
179

Since the Polish risings, the situation has changed radically: today
there is a real possibility of the Western democracies passing from the
defensive to the offensive. As long as the West is able to preserve a
strong Atlantic Alliance, it can prevent further Russian military ex-
pansion. It cannot use military means against all-powerful Red armies.
In this way Western policy remains defensive. Yet the political and
ideological potential of the Western democracies is far stronger than
that of the Communists. The West could tighten the crisis of Communism
through a political offensive exploiting all the forces in revolt behind
the Iron Curtain, against the despotism of the Kremlin and Communist
dictatorship.
A political offensive means above all timely political and diplomatic
action. Astute Western diplomacy could deprive the Russians of the
initiative that they have held for so long. The Reagan team may have
the capacity for this enlightened diplomacy. Whenever it is possible
to anticipate events, it is best to try to influence them in favor of
the cause of freedom. Vigorous propaganda, truthfully interpreting the
crisis of the Communist world, could sharpen inner tension and help the
forces of liberalization. The fundamental demands, postulated by the
Czech reformers and Polish workers, provided safe directives for pro-
paganda to pierce the Iron Curtain. Every suitable expedient should
be used. It should be made possible for great numbers of people from
Russia and other Communist countries to travel to the free world.




be organized. Democracies cannot control their tourists as effectively
as Communist Governments control their own people who are allowed to
visit the West, but it would be possible to instruct at least some of
them to consider themselves as envoys behind the Iron Curtain - envoys of
the free world.
It seems expedient to develop as much as possible the cultural rela-
tions between West and East in order to strengthen those in the East who
long for freedom of spirit. In some circumstances even economic or
financial aid granted by the Americans and other Western countries could
strengthen the liberation movements. Credits to Poland were a step in
this direction.
When the danger of a general war diminishes, the task of diplomacy
and propaganda must increase. In the eyes of the Russians 'peaceful co-
exi stance' does not mean the end of the struggle between capitalism and
Communism, but a permanent, ruthless war waged by political and economic
weapons. Communists engage in this all the more stubbornly and merciles-
sly when faced by a domestic crisis. The Western democracies would need
now, even more than in the past, a central staff for an intensive
political and ideological war against the Communist world.
The political, diplomatic, propaganda and cultural weapons used
systematically in a combined operation by the West could strengthen
and encourage the forces of liberalization that need sustaining in the
struggle for freedom behind the Iron Curtain.
25
Vladimir Sakharov, High Treason,
a
dvocated the exchange of visits
between the West and the East to expose the debilities of the Soviet
Union and the strength of the free countries.
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Combined internal and external pressure could eventually persuade
the Russians seriously to negotiate with the West about a new political
settlement in Europe. This would inevitably lead to their leaving the
dominating positions that they have occupied in the centre of Europe
since the end of the war. The hopes of German reunification would cease
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